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1.1  Introduction 
This paper analyzes the role of the United States in the development 
of Latin America’s international trade relations. In particular the paper 
investigates the behavior of trade flows between the United States and 
the Latin American nations in the last fifteen years or so, and analyzes 
the possible path these trade relations will take in the future. In doing 
this, I place special emphasis on any possible changes in the directions 
of  trade in Latin America, scrutinizing whether there has been, or will 
possibly be, a significant increase in south-south trade, and if new trade 
partners such as Japan and the newly industrialized countries of South- 
east Asia have displaced the more traditional  Latin American trade 
partners (i.e.,  the  United  States), The paper also  deals  with  issues 
related to direct investment in Latin America, comparing the impor- 
tance of the United States and other nations. Finally, I also discuss the 
role of international trade in the solution to the current Latin American 
debt crisis and in the resumption of  sustained growth in the region. An 
important, indeed crucial, issue relates to the future evolution of the 
current protectionist mood in  the United States and much of  the de- 
veloped world. 
As we enter the final years of the 1980s, policy issues related to the 
volume and direction of U.  S.  international trade have become increas- 
ingly important. In particular, a number of special interest lobbies have 
argued with alarming insistence that the “increased  competition”  by 
other countries to capture foreign markets and unfair trade practices, 10  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0. EnderdJesus Silva-Herzog 
such as dumping and export subsidy schemes not sanctioned by  the 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), have been respon- 
sible for the mounting trade deficits and for the “loss of jobs” in the 
United States. Several important questions emerge here: First, what 
is meant exactly by “loss of U.S. international competitiveness”? Sec- 
ond, given an answer to the first question, has the United States indeed 
lost competitiveness? Third, what are the future prospects for U.S. 
trade relations? And finally, what and to whom will the United States 
export in the future, and from which countries will U.S. imports come? 
The present paper deals with these questions from the perspective of 
the U.S. trade relations with Latin America. 
The evolution of the volume and direction of  trade is also of  para- 
mount importance for the Latin American countries. In the early 1980s, 
after two decades of  sustained economic growth averaging approxi- 
mately 6 percent per annum, Latin America entered a period of severe 
adjustment. The need for this adjustment resulted, to a large extent, 
from a series of major shocks-both  exogenous and policy induced- 
that greatly disturbed the region’s economy. The principal exogenous 
shocks were the oil price increases of 1973-74 and 1979-80, the drastic 
deterioration of the terms of trade experienced after 1980, and the steep 
rise of world interest rates in 1980-82 which provoked a major increase 
in the debt service burden. At the policy level, the substantial increases 
in government expenditure and fiscal deficits and the economic liber- 
alization  reforms attempted  by  some of  these countries, as well  as 
general and very significant increases in  external indebtedness, con- 
stituted the most important events. Some countries went from being 
highly praised “economic miracles” to “international pariahs.” Others, 
which in the mid- to late  1970s were flooded with abundant foreign 
exchange-obtained  mainly through  the exportation of  petroleum- 
have experienced severe difficulties servicing their foreign debt. The 
region is at this moment still struggling to overcome its worst recession 
since the 1930s. As it slowly emerges from the crisis, it finds a sub- 
stantial portion of its export earnings mortgaged for the foreseeable 
future to service the accumulated external debt and a general scarcity 
of additional external funds. 
There is little doubt that a permanent solution to Latin America’s 
current crisis and ‘the resumption  of  sustained growth will  require a 
major effort to increase exports and to enhance the role of the external 
sector as a source of foreign exchange earnings. In that regard, it is 
especially important to determine whether the Latin American coun- 
tries’ efforts to increase their exports will be frustrated by protectionist 
policies implemented by  the industrialized nations. Indeed, the Latin 
American countries’ efforts to adjust and put the crisis behind them 
would receive a severe blow if the current protectionist lobby scores 11  The United States and Foreign Competition in  Latin America 
victories in the United States and European countries. Increased pro- 
tectionism could take two forms: the enactment of protective legislation 
or the stepping up of  the already significant nontariff barriers existing 
in these countries. 
Some of the sections of this paper are largely descriptive; this has 
been deliberate since an important purpose of this study is to scrutinize 
the data and to document and interpret the recent history of the Latin 
American trade relations  with the United  States. In spite of the de- 
scriptive tone of some sections, the paper as a whole makes a number 
of analytical points related to the nature of these external relations. 
Section 1.2 discusses some of the main current characteristics of the 
Latin American economies as well as the way in which the region’s 
external sector policies  have  evolved. Section  1.3 deals  with  Latin 
American imports; it investigates the recent behavior of the region’s 
degree of openness, aggregate imports, and origin of imports at the 
disaggregated  level. In this section I show that much of the region’s 
effort to cope with the debt crisis has been translated into a substantial 
drop in the real value of imports. This section contains massive amounts 
of data on how much, what, and from whom sixteen Latin American 
countries import. Emphasis is placed on analyzing the evolution of the 
U.S. share of the value of Latin America’s imports and the changing 
composition of  the region’s imports from the United States. I show 
here that when the constant-market-share criterion is used, there is no 
support for the contention of a recent loss of aggregate U.S. compet- 
itiveness in Latin America. The data, however, do show that there has 
been a change in the composition of Latin America’s imports from the 
United  States. The share of  traditional  manufacturing  has declined, 
while primary  products and technology-intensive  manufactures have 
experienced an increased presence among the region’s imports. 
Section 1.4 deals with Latin America’s exports and investigates their 
recent behavior and composition.  It shows that in spite of a series of 
corrective measures taken by these countries since the debt crisis, for 
the region as a whole the recent evolution of the (real) value of exports 
has been very disappointing. An important issue analyzed in this sec- 
tion is related to the role of protectionism in the industrialized countries 
on the possible access of Latin American products to those markets. 
Using recent data on nontariff barriers, I show that the extent of these 
nontariff impediments to trade is much more generalized than previ- 
ously thought. I then argue that only to the extent that a drastic change 
occurs in the protectionist  mood in the industrial world will it be pos- 
sible for Latin America’s trade to gain in prominence. 
Section 1.5 deals with commercial policy and protectionism in Latin 
America. Here I show how in the late 1960s and 1970s, after the heyday 
of  the import substitution  development strategy,  most of  the Latin 12  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0.  EnderdJesus Silva-Herzog 
American countries slowly began to reduce their impediments to trade. 
This trend, which was particularly marked in the Southern Cone coun- 
tries in the late 1970s, was reversed in the 1980s when, as a consequence 
of the debt crisis, most of  these countries resorted to the imposition 
of controls to reduce imports. In this section I also discuss the role of 
nontariff barriers in Latin America. Section 1.6 deals with exchange 
rate policies. Here two main issues are addressed. First, I look at the 
behavior of real exchange rates in these nations and argue that the fairly 
generalized tendency toward overvaluation in the late 1970s and early 
1980s greatly contributed to the poor behavior of the region’s external 
sector. Second, I point  out  how  the existence  of  multiple nominal 
exchange rates and of pervasive parallel markets for foreign exchange 
have played an important protective role in these countries. Section 
1.7 deals with direct investment. Here I analyze the historical evidence 
and argue that in  the next few years direct investment will probably 
be one of the more important sources of external financing that these 
countries will have. This, of course, will require some creative rethink- 
ing of  the  current  regional policy  on direct foreign investment and 
related issues. Finally, section 1.8 deals with the possible future evo- 
lution of U.S.-Latin  American trade relations and contains the con- 
cluding remarks. 
1.2  The Latin American Economies: A Brief Overview 
Table 1.1 contains data on a number of economic indicators for six- 
teen Latin American countries.  There are very marked  differences 
across the countries of the region in terms of income per capita, recent 
growth performance, and inflation, which of course makes generali- 
zations difficult. In fact there is no such thing as “the representative” 
Latin American country. Therefore my analysis generally provides data 
on only these sixteen countries. 
Although today  the countries of  Latin America are economically 
diverse and stand at different junctions of their development paths, 
they share a common evolution of  their policies toward the external 
sector. In the rest of this section, and to put things in perspective, I 
provide  a brief description of the role of  the external  sector in  the 
development of the Latin American countries. 
1.2.1  Latin American Development and External Sector Policies 
Until the 1930s the external sector in the great majority of the Latin 
American countries was highly opened; exchange controls were almost 
nonexistent, import tariffs were low, and the “rules of the game” were 
strictly followed. The Great Depression, with its devastating effect on Table 1.1  Basic Indicators for Selected Latin American Countries 
1984 
Total Long- 
Average  Term Gross  Average Rate  GNP 
per  Capita  Growth GDP (%)  Foreign  Manufacturing 
1984  Inflation  Debt  Production 
(1984 US$)  1965-73  1973-84  1973-84  (%)  as % GNP  as % GDP 1984 
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Source: World Bank. 14  Sebastian EdwardslThomas 0.  EnderdJesus Silva-Herzog 
the region’s economies, put an end to all of that; it marked the beginning 
of an epoch of import substitution and protectionism.* 
During the 1950s and 1960s, under the intellectual leadership of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and 
its  charismatic secretary  general  Raul  Prebisch,  most  of  the  Latin 
American countries embarked on ambitious industrialization programs 
based on import substitution. This strategy was based on the idea that 
high import tariffs and other impediments to international trade would 
provide  temporary protection  to the local industries and help them 
develop. In  theory,  after some time the domestic firms would have 
“learned” and protection would no longer be necessary (Prebisch 1984). 
Things did  not  work  out as predicted by  the theory,  however,  and 
protection became a permanent feature in the region. As a result, in 
most of these countries the industrial sector that was developed under 
the barriers of protection was largely inefficient, using highly capital- 
intensive techniques (Krueger 1983). 
During the 1950s and first half of the 1960s it became apparent that 
the import substitution strategy was losing dynamism. Although the 
easier and more obvious imports had already been substituted, these 
countries remained highly “dependent”  on imported intermediate in- 
puts and capital goods. At the same time the highly overvalued do- 
mestic  currencies conspired  against  the  development of  a  dynamic 
export sector, with the consequent scarcity of foreign e~change.~ 
During the late 1960s a reaction against excessive protectionism started 
to take place, and a number of countries-Colombia  being the premier 
example-moved  toward export promotion  schemes (Diaz-Alejandro 
1976). Also during this period some serious efforts were made to create 
common markets comprising subgroups of Latin American countries. 
In that respect the creation of the Andean group and the Central Amer- 
ican Common Market were particularly important. Although in some 
regards these integrationist schemes were successful, they did not turn 
around the region’s economies, and in many cases the external sector- 
and the excessive protectionism-was  still seen as the “weak link” by 
most analysts (see Blejer 1984). 
During the second half of  the 1970s a fairly generalized recognition 
of the benefits of export promotion had developed, and most countries 
tended to rationalize their external sector. In the countries of the South- 
ern Cone (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay), massive reforms aimed at 
opening up these economies were implemented: tariffs were reduced, 
and exchange controls disappeared. After an initial successful period, 
these opening reforms faltered, and in the early 1980s these countries 
entered into a major recession, as did the rest of Latin Ameri~a.~  The 
1980 crisis forced the Latin American countries to greatly reduce their 
imports and to improve their current account balances. As discussed 15  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
in section 1.5, most countries resorted to increased import controls in 
their attempts to improve their foreign accounts. 
1.3  The Structure and Evolution of Imports in Latin America 
This section analyzes the recent evolution of imports in Latin Amer- 
ica, placing special emphasis on the role of the United States as a trade 
partner. An important question addressed here is whether the available 
data show any trend in the value of Latin America’s imports from the 
United States. The analysis focuses on three important aspects of this 
problem. We  first look at the historical evaluation of the dollar value 
of international trade (imports and exports) in Latin America. Second, 
we analyze the evolution of the degree of openness of the countries in 
the region, and we also look in detail at the behavior of the trade and 
current account balances.  And third, we analyze the distribution of 
Latin American imports both across countries and across productive 
sectors, looking in detail at the United  States’ and other countries’ 
shares of the value of Latin American imports. 
1.3.1 
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 contain data on the dollar value of imports and 
exports for fourteen Latin American countries between 1965 and 1985. 
In table 1.4 the current account balances for these countries are pre- 
sented. Table 1.5 presents the evolution of indicators of openness de- 
fined as the ratio of total trade-imports  plus exports-to  GDP. 
Table 1.2 on imports is extremely revealing, showing that for most 
countries the (nominal) dollar value of imports peaked between 1980 
and 1982, only to experience a dramatic fall in the years following the 
eruption of the debt crisis. In every single country the (nominal) dollar 
value of imports in 1985 was well below its 1980 level. For these four- 
teen countries as a whole the (nominal) dollar value of imports was, 
in  1985, 36 percent below its 1980 value. Moreover, when expressed 
in real dollar terms, 1985 total imports are 45 percent below their 1980 
value.5 Of course, this mainly reflects the reduction in imports required 
by the adjustment programs implemented by these countries after the 
1982 debt crisis.6 Table 1.3 on the value of  exports also reflects the 
effects of the adjustment programs. In a number of these countries- 
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico-the  value of exports was in 
1985 significantly above its 1980 value. This was achieved in spite of 
the fact that for most of the countries in the region the international 
prices  of  their exports declined  substantially  during the period  (see 
section 1.4). 
Imports, Exports, and the Degree of Openness Table 1.2  Evolution of Imports in Selected Latin American Countries, 1965-85  (millions of 
U.S. dollars) 































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund. Table 1.3  Evolution of  Exports in Selected Latin American Countries, 1965-85  (millions of 
U.S. dollars) 































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund. Table 1.4  Current Account Balance in Selected Latin American Countries, 1965-85 (millions of 
U.S. dollars) 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Argentina  222  -163  -1,287  -4,774  -2,353  -2,436  -2,495  -  954 
Bolivia  -  24  4  -  130  -  118  -  94  -  151  -  179  -  282 
Brazil  284  -837  -7,008  -12,806  -16,312  -6,837  42  -  273 
Chile  -  43  -  91  -490  -1,971  -2,304  -1,117  -2,060  -1,307 
Colombia  -  21  -  293  -  172  -206  -3,054  -3,003  -1,401  -1,390 
Costa Rica  -  68  -  74  -218  -  664  -  278  -317  -  253  -  374 
Dominican Republic  43  -  102  -  73  -671  -  443  -418  -  163  n.a. 
Ecuador  -  19  -  113  -  220  -642  -1,195  -  104  -  248  -  85 
Guatemala  -  35  -8  -  66  -  163  -  399  -  224  -  377  -  246 
Mexico  -352  -1,068  -4,042  -8,162  -6,218  5,328  3,966  540 
Panama  -  100  -64  -  169  -311  -51  247  -  70  21 
Peru  -  -22  -1,541  62  -1,612  -  875  -  223  53 
Uruguay  72  -  45  -  190  -  709  -  235  -  60  -124  -  108.1 
Venezuela  35  -  104  2,171  4,728  -4,246  4,427  5,418  2,923 
Source: International Monetary Fund. 19  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
Table 1.4 on the current account balances also vividly portrays the 
impact of the crisis on the region’s external sector and the substantial 
efforts the region has made to adjust to the new post-1982 reality. In 
eleven of the fourteen countries, the current account balance experi- 
enced a substantial improvement between  1980 and 1985. Moreover, 
five of these countries-Argentina,  Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uru- 
guay-turned  trade deficits into fairly large trade surpluses during this 
period. 
Table 1.5 contains data on an indicator of these economies’ degree 
of  openness: the ratio of total trade (imports plus exports) to GDP. 
Although the behavior of this index differs from country to country, it 
is still possible to draw some general pattern of behavior. According 
to this index there was a fairly significant increase in the degree of 
openness in the 1970s. This general move toward greater openness is 
revealed both  when  1975 is compared  with  1970 and when  1980 is 
compared with 1970. For example, between  1970 and 1975 the index 
of total trade to GDP experienced significant increases in twelve of the 
thirteen countries that have data. During this period, in nine out of the 
thirteen  countries that have data the ratio of total trade to GDP in- 
creased by at least five percentage points, and in two other countries 
it increased by more than two percentage points. Only in the cases of 
Bolivia and Costa Rica did this index decline. Moreover, the ratio of 
Table 1.5  Openness Index in Selected Latin American Countries, 1965-85 




















































































Note: This index was constructed as the ratio of total trade (imports plus exports) to 
GDP. 
Source: Constructed from data from the International Monetary Fund. 
a1983. 
b1984. 20  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0. Enderdlesus Silva-Herzog 
imports to GDP tells very much the same story. Only for the cases of 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador did it decline between 1970 and 1980.’ 
Generally speaking the available evidence strongly indicates that the 
1970s was a decade where most of the nations of Latin America became 
more open to the rest of the world. In fact, as shown in section 1.5, 
this openness is reflected in the evolution of the level of import tariffs 
and other impediments to trade during this period. 
As table 1.5 clearly shows, during the first half of the 1980s the trend 
toward greater openness was drastically reversed, with the openness 
index exhibiting a sharp drop for most countries. This, of course, was 
partially  the  consequence of  the crisis and adjustment policies that 
required a significant cut in imports. Table 1.5 shows that in the case 
of  the total trade ratio, in nine of  the fourteen countries there was a 
decline between 1980 and 1985.8 The imports ratios also experienced 
significant declines in twelve of the fourteen countries; in most of these 
countries the 1985 imports ratios were significantly below their  1970 
and 1975 values. 
1.3.2  The Composition of  Imports 
In this section we look at the evolution of different countries’ shares 
of the value of Latin America’s imports both at an aggregate and dis- 
aggregate level. This analysis is particularly important to assess whether 
the United States has experienced a loss in its competitive position in 
the region. In fact, according to the so-called constant-market-share 
criterion, a country’s degree of competitiveness in a particular market 
will remain constant (decrease) if  its  share of  that region’s imports 
remains constant   decrease^).^ However, the discussion that follows 
should be interpreted with some caution, since these are shares of the 
U.S. dollar value of imports and are thus influenced by changes in the 
real value of the dollar. In particular, a real appreciation of the dollar 
will result in an increase in these market shares, even if the quantities 
imported from the United States and other countries remain constant. 
Naturally, a real depreciation of the dollar will have the opposite effect: 
it will decrease the market shares even if quantities imported are not 
affected.  lo In spite of  this shortcoming, however, the analysis of  the 
evolution of market shares is revealing. Moreover, these shares are the 
only indicators on the distribution of Latin American imports that can 
be constructed with the available data. 
Aggregate Trends 
Tables 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 contain data on the percentage distribution 
of the value of imports for sixteen Latin American countries for 1977- 
85. These data give us information on what fraction of the U.S. dollar 
value  of each of  these countries’ imports  came from  industrialized 21 
Table 1.6  Upper-Income Latin American Countries: Distribution of Total 
Imports by Origin, 1977-85  (percentage) 
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
- 


























































68.2  69.1  62.8 
22.6  22.2  35.1 
-  12.8 
5.6  4.5  3.3 
































46.6  41.8  38.6 
18.6  16.3  15.0 
4.8  5.7  4.6 
36.4  41.4  41.9 































60.1  60.7  57.0 
28.5  25.6  26.0 
7.2  10.6  6.5 
5.2  7.6  7.7 































85.8  87.1  88.2 
61.6  63.8  59.9 
5.1  5.0  5.7 
0.2  0.2  0.3 































35.9  35.8  34.7 
9.8  9.7  12.3 
4.1  4.9  2.8 
25.4  21.4  27.8 































86.3  86.1  84.6 
47.8  48.3  43.5 
8.0  8.0  9.8 
12.6  13.1  14.2 
















Source: Constructed from data reported by the International  Monetary  Fund. 
Note: These indexes  were constructed as the  ratio  of  the dollar value of  each year’s 
imports from a particular  country (or group of  countries) to total imports. Table 1.7  Middle-Income Latin American Countries: Distribution of Total 
Imports by Origin, 1977-85  (percentage) 

























































































































































































































































































































Source: See table  1.6. 23  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
Table 1.8  Lower-Income Latin American Countries: Distribution of Total 
Imports by  Origin, 1977-85 (percentage) 





























58.9  56.4  43.7  42.0  40.2  39.9  37.0 
28.8  31.4  25.3  27.4  25.2  18.9  20.8 
10.1  6.9  3.8  3.2  1.6  1.4  1.4 
11.4  11.6  18.5  16.7  11.4  11.3  10.0 
29.3  31.3  37.5  40.7  47.7  47.7  49.5 
60.2  60.6  54.9  35.9  46.9  49.3  50.8 
29.3  30.8  28.4  19.9  25.5  33.6  38.5 
11.0  11.8  7.9  3.9  3.4  2.8  3.3 
9.3  7.6  11.1  25.2  4.1  3.6  3.0 
29.6  31.2  32.9  37.8  40.4  35.4  46.1 
67.7  66.5  66.0  67.0  64.8  60.2  69.3 
42.9  41.9  43.3  42.4  41.5  39.5  47.5 
11.0  8.8  7.7  9.9  6.7  6.5  6.2 
5.4  6.2  8.4  10.4  4.4  1.9  1.8 
25.6  25.8  24.3  21.3  29.7  36.7  28.8 
58.7  66.2  61.0  61.1  57.9  59.8  55.7 
23.0  27.2  28.4  28.5  22.9  28.9  26.4 
13.4  13.3  9.7  9.7  11.9  11.0  3.6 
0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  -  - 









































Source: See table  1.6. 
countries, what share came from oil-exporting LDCs (less developed 
countries) and what share from non-oil-exporting LDCs. For the case 
of industrialized countries an additional refinement has been made by 
explicitly identifying the U.S. and the Japanese shares. Since a few 
minor trade partners-mainly  from  the  Soviet bloc-have  been  ex- 
cluded, the sum of  these shares does not necessarily add up to one 
hundred. Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 depict the U.S. share of these coun- 
tries’ imports for the same period. 
Several facts emerge from these tables and figures. First, the distri- 
bution of imports varies significantly across countries. For example, 
while in some of them the U.S. share in  total imports is in the 20 
percent to 25 percent range (i.e,, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia), in others 
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Fig. 1.1  U.S.  share  of  Latin  American  imports,  upper-income 
countries. 
others it is below  10 percent (i.e., Uruguay). Second, and more im- 
portant,  these tables-and  in  particular  these figures-show  clearly 
that for the great majority of  the Latin American countries there have 
been no perceptible changes in the proportion of imports coming from 
the United States."  Third, even a very detailed analysis at the country 
level reveals that there is no clear common pattern in  the shares be- 
havior during the years immediately following the debt crisis. However, 
in 1982 or 1983 in some of  the large- and medium-size countries there 
Fig. 1.2 
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
YEAR 
U.S. share  of  Latin  American  imports,  middle-income 
countries. 25  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
Fig. 1.3  U.S.  share  of  Latin  American  imports,  lower-income 
is a slight drop in the share of imports coming from the industrialized 
countries (Argentina, 1982; Brazil, 1982; Chile, 1982 and 1983; Mexico, 
1983). In Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela there is also a decline in 
the U.S. share in either 1982 and 1983. Finally, eleven of these countries 
experienced a slight increase in the industrialized  countries’ market 
share in 1985 (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colom- 
bia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Bolivia). More- 
over, in the cases of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Bolivia, the U.S. share of  imports experienced some 
increase between  1984 and 1985. 
An important question is whether this lack of trend in the U.S.  share 
of the Latin American imports market is only a recent phenomenon 
(i.e., post-1977) or if it reflects a longer-run phenomenon. To investigate 
this issue, trend regressions for 1970-83  were estimated both for the 
region as a whole and for each of the fourteen countries in table  1.1. 
The results obtained were definitive, showing that for the region as a 
whole there has been  no statistically  significant change in the U.S. 
market share of  aggregate Latin American imports. At the individual 
country level there were no changes in nine cases, while in two coun- 
tries (Mexico and Peru) there has been an increase in the U.S. share; 
five countries show a decline (Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua). Naturally, the Nicaraguan trend responded mainly to 
political reasons. l2 Surprisingly perhaps, according to this statistical 
analysis the U.S. market share of these sixteen Latin American coun- 
tries was not sensitive to contemporaneous or lagged fluctuations in 
the real value of  the dollar. In the appendix we present the detailed 
results from this regression analysis. 
countries. 26  Sebastian EdwardslThomas 0.  EnderdJesus Silva-Herzog 
This aggregate market share analysis, then, suggests categorically 
that for the vast majority of these countries the popular contention that 
the United States has experienced a major loss of its degree of com- 
petitiveness in the region is not supported by the data. What has hap- 
pened is something very different: the value-both  nominal and real- 
of  U.S. exports to Latin America has declined severely since 1980. 
This, however, has little to do with loss of aggregate competitiveness; 
it is simply the result of the debt crisis and the accompanying monu- 
mental fall in  Latin America’s total imports during the period.  The 
region still gets (approximately) the same proportion of its much re- 
duced imports from the United States. 
What Does Latin America Import from the United States? 
In the preceding subsection we looked at aggregate import shares 
and found that in  most cases the share of the dollar value of  imports 
coming from the United States has not exhibited a trend. In this sub- 
section we ask What do these countries import from the United States? 
Tables 1.9- 1.14 show, for six of the larger Latin American countries, 
how their imports from the United States were distributed across ten 
“categories,”  or sections numbered from 0 to 9, for the years 1970- 
83.13 Each cell in each of these tables indicates what proportion of that 
particular country’s imports from the United States corresponds to 
that  specific “category.”  Consequently, except for rounding errors, 
these percentages add up to 100 across each category for each year. 
Table 1.9  Argentina: Imports from the United States as a Fraction of Total 
U.S. Imports 
Total  Total  Category 
$  $ 















































































.045  0  ,173 
,069  ,008  ,207 
,037  ,001  .23 
,058  0  .206 
.065  0  ,331 
.I11  0  ,294 
.09  0  ,315 
,058  0  .246 
.074  0  .208 
.034  0  ,179 
.04  0  ,188 
.07  ,001  .269 
.038  ,001  ,328 
,262  ,408  ,062  0 
.I3  ,462  ,059  0 
.I2  .489  ,042  0 
.I4  ,284  ,043  0 
.I48  ,293  .046  0 
.I07  ,274  .042  0 
.I09  ,365  ,034  0 
.077  ,503  ,067  0 
.079  .52  .065  0 
.I06  ,521  .I1  0 
,112  ,498  ,114  0 
,089  .456  .068  0 
.I01  .413  .068  0 
Source: CEPAL. 
Note: Data for 1977 not available. Table 1.10  Brazik Imports from the United States as a Fraction of Total 
U.S. Imports 
Total  Total  Category 
'  0123456789 
$ 















2,829.5  915.9  .075  0 
3,657.7  1,040.6  .093  0 
4,715.1  1,320.4  .049  0 
6,917.4  1,982.4  .137  .001 
14,061.5  3,401.6  .081  .001 
13,575.8  3,379.1  .093  0 
13,748.2  3,102.7  .088  0 
13,567.3  2,758.5  .041  0 
15,630.9  3,423.5  .I61  0 
20,568.0  3,994.3  .123  0 
25,601.2  4,922.9  .I41  0 
24,768.5  4,362.9  .215  0 
21,958.5  3,719.7  ,149  0 
17,293.1  2,834.9  .I79  0 
.036  .08  ,003  ,196  .I29 
.044  .064  ,007  .2  .I06 
.044  ,0457  ,003  ,223  .095 
.038  ,039  .004  .I91  ,128 
.047  .038  .011  .237  .I79 
.039  ,056  ,004  .234  ,108 
.039  ,057  ,002  .266  .081 
.042  .067  .001  ,286  .09 
,037  .043  0  .262  .079 
,044  ,062  ,007  .279  .084 
.034  .06  .006  .294  .084 
,033  .056  0  .I95  .079 
.038  ,088  .001  .I88  .084 















.05  0 
.05  0 
.063  .002 
.053  .001 
.042  0 
.045  0 
.047  0 
.051  0 
.048  0 
.05  0 
.047  0 
,045 0 
.052  0 
.058  0 
Source: CEPAL. 
Table 1.11  Chile: Imports from the United States as a Fraction of 
Total U.S. Imports 
Total  Total  Category 
$  $ 







































































.019  .034 
.03  .04 
,103  .04 
.056  .068 
,056  ,065 
,032  ,022 
.038  .036 
,045  .051 
,026  .031 
.026  .012 
,023  .041 
.027  .017 
.024  .033 

























































.041  .001 
.058  0 
,048  0 
.039  .O 
.03  0 
,031  0 
.041  0 
.075  0 
,064  0 
.067  0 
,066  0 
.082  0 
.086  0 
.068  0 
Source: CEPAL. Table 1.12  Mexico: Imports from the United States as a Fraction of Total 
U.S. Imports 
Total  Total  Category 
0123456789 
$  $ 































































































































































,041  0 




.051  0 
.044 0 
.05  0 
.05  0 
.05  0 
Source: CEPAL 
Table 1.13  Colombia: Imports from the United States as a Fraction of Total 
U.S. Imports 
Total  Total  Category 
$  $ 
Year  World  U.S. 
1970  836.4  397.3  .042  .023  .05  .013  .01  .182 .12  .5 15  ,042 .002 
197  1  917.0  390.2  .092  .009  .054  .01  .02  .167 .093  .51  ,038  ,006 
1972  853.1  333.9  .09  .002 .058  ,005  .019  .19  .09  SO4  .04  ,002 
1973  1,059.4  430.4  .156  .005  .077  .004  .021  .223 .084  ,376  ,052 .002 
1974  1,593.8  640.4  .141  .004  .064  .003  .028  ,266 .I I  ,334 .048  .002 
1975  1,494.5  644.8  .I 14  .003  .05  .007  .022  ,225 .lo6  .43  1  .04  .002 
1976  1,707.7  725.1  .117  ,002 .046  ,006  ,049 .168 ,119  .451  .041  ,002 
1977  2,028.0  753.1  .lo7  .009 .041  .006  ,058  .22  ,085  .428  .043  ,003 
1978  2,836.0  999.3  .I49  ,011  .033  .01  .048  .207 .09  .41  .04  .003 
1979  3,232.9  1,278.7 ,103  ,012 .039  .093  .065  ,174 .081  .386  .043  .003 
1980  4,662.3  1,839.8  .133  ,014 ,036 .081  ,046 ,186 .085  ,374 .04  .004 
1981  5,198.8  1,787.4  ,087 .013  .028  .05 1  ,054 ,193 .lo9  ,399  .052  .014 
1982  5,477.3  1,884.9 .I12  .012  .039  .033  .041  .I81  .lo3  .424  .047  .008 
1983  4,950.6  1,761.8 .13  1  .01  I  .046  ,018  .04  .182  .099  ,413  .05  1  .009 
Source: CEPAL. 29  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
Table 1.14  Venezuela: imports &om the United States as a Fraction of Total 
U.S. Imports 
Total  Total  Category 















1,902.6  924.8 
2,124.9  945.3 
2,485.4  1,107.6 
2,844.2  1,194.1 
4,307.6 2,448.2 
5,806.7  2,821.8 
6,905.2 3,098.9 
11,200.0  4,340.5 
11,667.9  4,829.4 
11,037.0  5,085.7 
12,257.7 5,898.3 
13,555.9  6,555.0 
13,389.8 6,128.8 
6,146.5  2,849.6 
.1  0 
.lo4 0 
.112  0 
.123  0 
.ll  0 
.097 0 
.086  ,001 
,091 0 
.077  .001 
.094  0 
.125  .001 
.142  .001 
.lo6  .001 
.202  .001 
.058  .021 
.053  ,011 
,047 ,005 
.041  .004 
.073  .003 
,043 ,004 
.036  .004 
.032  .009 
,037 ,007 
,044 .009 
.047  .014 
.033  .012 
.038  .009 
.048  .012 
.009  .12  .119  SO9  ,063 
,016 .119  .115  32  ,059 
.011  ,109 .119  .534 .062 
.017  .lo6  .132  316  .06 
.016  .128  .156  ,464 ,049 
.021  .093  .146  .542  .053 
.009  .099  .118  ,595 ,051 
,012  .lo1  .135  S72  .048 
,017 .094  ,125  ,581  .061 
.02  .lo8  .131  53  ,062 
.023  .122  .13  .474  ,036 
.028  .lo4  .123  .494  .063 
.017  .lo8  ,131  315  ,076 
















These tables, constructed from data provided by the U.N.’s Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), also contain the dollar value 
of  total yearly imports for each country (column  1) as well as total 
yearly imports from the United States (column 2).14  Categories 0 through 
9 correspond to the SITC one-digit classification and are defined in the 
following way: 
Category 0:  Food stuffs and live animals 
Category  1: Beverages and tobacco 
Category 2:  Raw nonfood materials, except fuel 
Category 3:  Fuel and related products 
Category 4:  Oil, greases, and waxes of vegetable and animal origins 
Category 5: Chemical products 
Category 6: Manufactured products 
Category 7:  Machinery and transport equipment 
Category 8:  Other manufactured goods 
Category 9:  Other commodities 
Two important patterns emerge from these tables. First, with almost 
no exceptions, the bulk of these countrys’ imports from the United 
States have been concentrated throughout the period on the manufac- 
turing sector (categories 5-8), with capital goods (category 7) the most 
important single item in almost every country. 30  Sebastian Edwards/Thomas 0. EndedJesus Silva-Herzog 
Second, in spite of the dominating role of manufacturing, there is a 
clear decline through time in the relative importance of category 7 in 
almost every country. At the same time, categories 0 (foodstuffs and 
live animals) and 5 (chemical) have increased their relative shares. This 
change in the composition of Latin American imports from the United 
States, away from traditional labor-intensive manufacturing industries 
and into natural resources and capital-intensive (including human cap- 
ital) products (including food, farm products, and chemicals), reflects 
a change in the U.S. pattern of comparative advantage, which has been 
observed for some  years now.  In  fact, Leamer  (1984) has  recently 
shown that, according to the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory 
of international trade, the U.S. exports have shifted from being concen- 
trated on relatively more labor-abundant commodities to more capital- 
and resources-abundant products.  's 
U.S.  and Foreign Competition: Disaggregated Trends 
This section tackles the important question of how the Latin Amer- 
ican import shares of  different categories of imports are distributed 
among the United States and other countries. Tables 1.15- 1.18 provide 
disaggregated information on the distribution of imports for the twelve 
upper-middle-income and middle-income Latin American countries for 
which these data are available. The disaggregation used here distin- 
guishes  between  primary  products and  manufactured goods.  These 
tables  contain  data for the years  1970, 1975, 1980, and  1983 on the 
shares of each of these categories that have been imported from (a)  the 
rest of Latin America and the Caribbean; (6) the United States; (c) Japan; 
(6,  the rest (i.e., other than the United States or Japan) of the OECD; 
(e)  the Soviet bloc (CAME); and (f) the rest of  the world. To  know 
whether a given share represents a low or high dollar value, on each 
of these tables data on the dollar value of imports of each category is 
also included (first column). These tables contain the most recent data 
available and have been  constructed from  raw  information obtained 
from the  U.N.'s  Economic Commission for Latin America  (ECLA) 
(see CEPAL 1986d). 
The two commodities categories in  these tables are defined in the 
following way:  l6 (1)  primary products-foodstuffs;  live animals; bev- 
erages; tobacco; raw nonfood materials except fuel; oil, greases, and 
waxes of  vegetable and animal origins (that is, categories 0, 1, 2, and 
4 as defined above); and (2) manufactured goods-categories 5, 6, 7, 
and 8. 
From these tables we detect some common patterns across countries. 
First, perhaps with the exception of intra-Latin  American imports of 
manufactured goods, there are no drastic changes in the distribution 
of imports between 1970 and 1983. A second interesting pattern is that 31  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
Table 1.15  Upper-Middle-Income  Countries: Imports of Primary Products, 
Selected Years, 1970-83 
Total  L.A. and  Rest of  CAME  Rest of 








































































































































































































in  Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay a majority  of  imports of  primary 
products came, for all these years, from other Latin American coun- 
tries. Third, the increased importance of imports of primary products 
from the United States has been such that in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, 
Peru, Nicaragua,  El  Salvador, and Honduras the United  States has 
displaced other Latin American and Caribbean countries as the main 
providers of this type of good. Moreover, by 1983 most of these coun- 
tries imported almost half of their primary products from the United 
States. 
The distribution of the imports of fuels has not been shown in these 
tables, but behaves as expected: the majority of the region’s non-oil- 32  Sebastian Edwards/Thomas 0. Enders/Jesus Silva-Herzog 
Table 1.16  Middle-Income Countries: Imports of  Primary Products Selected 
Years, 1970-83 
Total  L.A. and  Rest of  Rest of 








































































































































































































producing countries import most of the fuel from oil producer Latin 
American countries, with the rest of the world (mainly OPEC countries 
in this instance) also being important. 
The data on manufacturing imports are particularly revealing. They 
show that in the majority of cases the OECD as a whole (United States, 
Japan, and the rest  of  OECD) lost ground  to competitors from the 
south, and in particular to other Latin American suppliers.17 As can 
be seen from tables 1.17 and 1.18, imports from other Latin American 
and Caribbean countries have increased significantly. Although Japan 
has in many cases made some progress, its presence in the region is 
far from overwhelming. Moreover, in many countries the share of Jap- 
anese manufactured  imports in  1983 was substantially lower than its 33  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
Table 1.17  Upper-Middle-Income  Countries: imports of Manufactured Goods, 
Selected Years, 1970-83 
Total  L.A. and  Rest of  Rest of 









































































































































































































1980 or even  1975 share (i.e., Argentina, Chile, Mexico,  Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Paraguay, Gautemala, Ecuador,  Nicaragua, El  Salvador, 
Honduras, and Bolivia). With regard to the United States, in many of 
the countries there is a decline in the share of manufactured imports, 
with Mexico being the major exception. 
1.4  Latin American Exports and Protectionism in the 
Industrialized Countries 
In this section we deal with the behavior of exports in Latin America 
during the last fifteen years or so. As already noted, after the 1982 debt 
crisis most Latin American countries implemented major adjustment 34  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0. Enders/Jesus Silva-Herzog 
Table 1.18  Middle-Income Countries: Imports of Manufactured Goods, 
Selected Years, 1970-83 
Total  L.A. and  Rest of  Rest of 








































































































































































































programs aimed at reducing the magnitude of their balance of payments 
problems. In the majority of cases these adjustment efforts have been 
largely successful; in fact, as documented in section 1.3, in most coun- 
tries both the current account and trade balances have experienced 
drastic improvements between 1980 and 1985. However, a fact many 
times overlooked is that for the region as a whole more than 100 percent 
of  the improved external situation has been the consequence of  the 
decline in imports; in many cases exports have even declined in  real 
terms between 1980 and 1985. For example, for the fourteen countries 
in table  1.2, real value of imports declined 45 percent between  1980 
and 1985 when the U.S. WPI is used as the relevant price index. On 
the other hand, for the thirteen countries for which there are data, the 35  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
total real  value of exports declined  by  almost  10 percent during the 
same period.I8 Of  course, in those countries where the real value of 
exports dropped, this was mainly the result of the fall in price of many 
of their countries’ principle exports. The extent of this decline in rel- 
ative export prices is captured in table  1.19 on the evolution of the 
terms of trade. 
There is  little doubt that  a definitive solution to Latin America’s 
pressing economic problems and the resumption of growth in the region 
will require a significant increase in exports. l9 Moreover, only to the 
extent that exports exhibit significant growth in the next few years will 
the region be able to increase its imports.20  A crucial question, then, 
is what and to whom will Latin America export in the next decade or 
so. The analysis that follows helps answer this important question. 
1.4.1 
Table  1.20 contains data on the regional distribution of  aggregate 
exports for our sixteen countries for 1970 through  1983. Tables 1.21 
and 1.22, on the other hand, contain more disaggregated data on the 
sectoral distribution of exports destination for the sixteen countries. 
Finally, tables 1.23 and 1.24 provide information for the upper-middle- 
income countries on the distribution of exports destination of primary 
products and manufactured goods.21 
A number of interesting facts emerge from these tables. First, at the 
aggregate level for the region as a whole (i.e., the sixteen countries) 
there is a decline in the proportion  of  exports going to the OECD. 
Exports to the United States, however, have not exhibited much of a 
trend. It is also clear from these tables that intra-Latin  American ex- 
The Destination of Latin American Exports 
Table 1.19  Terms of Trade Index: Selected Latin American Countries 
(1970 = 100) 





























































Source: CEPAL 1986a. Table 1.20  Destination of  Exports: Sixteen Latin American Countries, 1970-83 (percentage) 
~  ~ 
1970  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
Latin American 
andcambbean  13.4  16.5  15.8  16.1  15.6  16.4  16.2  15.9  14.3  10.5 
ALADI  9.3  12.5  12.1  12.7  12.1  13.4  13.2  12.8  11.8  8.2 
OECD  75.0  63.6  66.1  66.4  67.5  66.2  63.6  58.4  62.8  69.0 
U.S.  30.4  28.5  28.9  29.8  32.3  31.1  29.4  26.8  29.5  37.1 
Japan  5.8  4.8  4.8  4.5  4.4  4.5  4.9  4.6  6.0  5.5 
CAME  2.5  5.2  4.9  4.6  3.9  3.3  4.6  6.1  4.3  4.5 
Rest of  Asia  1.1  2.9  2.1  3.4  3.6  3.8  3.7  3.1  4.8  7.1 
Rest of  World  8.0  11.8  11.1  9.5  9.4  10.3  11.9  16.5  12.0  8.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Note: The countries included here are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru,  Uruguay, and Venezuela. 37  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
ports declined  substantially in  1982 and  1983. Finally, another inter- 
esting trend captured in table 1.20 is the steady increase in Latin Amer- 
ican exports going to the rest (i.e., non-Japan) of Asia and the Soviet 
bloc countries. 
The data in table 1.21 describe the evolution of the composition of 
regional exports. Several facts emerge from this table. First, exports 
of foodstuffs and agricultural products (category 0) have declined stead- 
ily throughout the period. Second, exports of fuel increased in impor- 
tance as a result of both the increases in the price of oil and the increased 
gas and oil production in the region. Third, manufactured exports cor- 
responding to categories 5 (chemicals), 8 (various manufactured prod- 
ucts), and 7 (machinery and transportation equipment) experienced an 
important increase. This trend is captured in an even cleaner way in 
table 1.22, which excludes full fuel: whereas in  1970 categories 5, 7, 
and 8 represented no more than 8 percent of nonfuel exports, in 1983 
they accounted for 23 percent. Fourth, these data also show that cat- 
egory 6 (manufactures) has approximately retained its relative impor- 
tance, accounting for around  19 percent of nonfuel exports. The dis- 
aggregated information on the destination of exports in tables 1.23 and 
1.24 shows that in the majority of the cases, exports of primary products 
go to the OECD. 
Table 1.24 shows that the proportion of the larger countries’ exports 
of manufactured goods that go to the United States has increased through 
time. In most cases this higher share of  exports to the United States 
has come out of declining shares of exports to the rest of Latin America. 
Table 1.25 contains data at an even more disaggregated level on the 
percentage distribution of the sixteen countries’ exports to the United 
States. For each year this table gives information on how Latin Amer- 
ican exports to the United States are distributed across the ten one- 
digit sections of the SITC (see section 1.3 for a detailed definition of 
these categories). By and large, this table confirms the patterns ob- 
served for total disaggregated exports reported in table 1.22. First, the 
relative importance of food product exports (category 0) has declined 
steadily during the period. This, of course, is but another reflection of 
the changing pattern of comparative advantages discussed above. As 
the production of food has become more capital intensive, the industrial 
countries, and in particular the United States, have tended to produce 
and export more and more food, while the poorer countries have ex- 
ported less and less of it (Learner 1984).22 
1.4.2  Protectionism in the Industrial Nations and the Future 
Evolution of Latin American Exports 
While most Latin American nations have been going through serious 
efforts aimed at improving their external balance, the industrial coun- Table 1.21  Sectoral Composition of Exports for Sixteen Latin American Countries,  1970-83 (percentage) 


































34.0  38.0 
0.9  0.9 
13.3  11.8 
28.4  25.5 
1 .6  2.0 
2.6  2.5 
11.8  11.3 
4.7  5.2 
2.6  2.9 
0.0  0.0 












30.2  26.0  23.4 
0.9  0.7  0.8 
11.4  10.6  10. I 
30.2  37.9  42.6 
1.9  I .5  1.5 
2.8  2.9  3.0 
13.8  11.4  9.7 
6.0  6.2  6.5 
3.0  2.7  2.5 
0.0  0.0  0.0 
65,454  83,096  89,718 
22.3  25.6 
1 .o  0.9 
9. I  8.5 
45 .O  40.3 
1.3  1.4 
3. I  3.4 
9.8  11.5 
6. I  7.8 
2.4  2.8 
0.0  0.0 
81,893  85.828 
Source: CEPAL. 
"Millions of  U.S. dollars. Table 1.22  Sectoral Composition of Nonfuel Exports of Sixteen Latin 
American Countries, 1970-83  (percentage) 







































Nore: Due to rounding, the sum across sections may not add up to  100 
Table 1.23  Upper-Middle-Income Countries: Exports of Primary Products, 
Selected Years, 1970-83 
Total  L.A. and  Rest of  Rest of 







































































































































































































Source : C  EPAL. 40  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0.  EnderslJesus Silva-Herzog 
Table 1.24  Upper-Middle-Income Countries: Exports of Manufactured  Goods, 
Selected Years, 1970-83 
Total  L.A. and  Rest of  Rest of 







































































































































































































tries have been invaded with protectionist sentiments. In fact, already 
in  the past few years the industrial  countries have used a  series of 
nontariff mechanisms to impede a freer flow of Latin American goods. 
According to the GATT (1984), industrial countries currently use more 
than forty nontariff  measures to impede international  flows of com- 
modities. 
A few authors have dealt with the issue of nontariff barriers, ana- 
lyzing the extent of these practices, their coverage across countries 
and products, and their evolution through time.23 For example, in a 
comprehensive recent study, Nogues, Olechowski,  and Winters (1986b) 41  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
Table 1.25  Sectoral Distribution of Sixteen Latin American Exports to the 
United States, 1970-83 (percentage) 











44.3  30.1  36.4  36.5  35.7  30.8  26.2  22.1  19.7  17.3 
0.4  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.8  1.1  1.4  0.6 
10.9  9.5  8.0  5.4  5.9  5.2  4.7  5.4  4.0  4.0 
25.6  44.3  37.6  39.4  36.0  44.6  52.0  51.5  55.0  48.5 
0.6  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1 
1.6  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.8  2.1  3.3  2.4  2.4 
12.5  6.6  8.6  8.9  10.2  9.0  6.9  16.2  8.5  11.5 
2.8  2.7  2.9  3.1  5.0  4.4  4.3  2.5  5.4  11.4 
1.4  3.4  3.4  3.5  4.3  3.2  2.8  0.2  3.3  4.4 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
analyzed the use of  nontariff barriers in sixteen industrialized  coun- 
tries.Z4 For the purpose of  their analysis they defined the following 
practices as nontariff barriers: prohibitions, quotas, discretionary im- 
port  authorizations,  conditional  import  authorizations,  “voluntary” 
export restraints, variable levies, minimum price systems, “voluntary” 
price restraints, tariff quotas, seasonal tariffs, price and volume in- 
vestigations, and antidumping and countervailing  duties.  Table  1.26 
contains data on an index of  the coverage of these nontariff barriers, 
defined as the proportion of  these countries’ imports of  a particular 
product that are subject to the NTBs (nontrade barriers).25  As can be 























Source: Nogues, Olechowski, and Winters 1986b. 
Nore:  This coverage index is defined as the proportion of these countries’ imports subject 
to the following nontariff  barriers: prohibitions,  quotas, discretionary import authori- 
zation, conditional import authorizations, “voluntary” export restraints, variable levies, 
minimum price systems, “voluntary”  price restraints, tariff quotas, seasonal tariffs. price 
and volume investigations, and antidumping and countervailing duties. 42  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0.  EnderdJesus Silva-Herzog 
seen, coverage of this type of impediments is quite broad, affecting 
more than one-fourth of all these countries’ imports, with textiles being 
the industry most severely affected. An important question is whether 
imports from all countries or regions are affected in the same way by 
the NTBs. Nogues, Olechowski, and Winters (1986a, 1986b) have shown 
that this is not the case; imports from the developing world are more 
severely affected by this type of “semidisguised” protectionism  than 
those from the industrialized world. 
Once the effects of  the NTBs are taken into account, the degree of 
protection the industrialized countries grant to some products can be 
remarkable.  Table 1.27, for example, estimates the total average rate 
of protection to which some Argentinian and Brazilian exports to the 
EEC, Japan, and the United States were subject in 1980. These figures 
are in many ways staggering, indicating that in many cases the NTBs 
more than double the tariff protection. 
What is even more serious is that the existing evidence clearly in- 
dicates a slow but  steady increase in  the degree of  coverage of  the 
NTBs. For example Nogues, Olechowski, and Winters (1986a) found 
that the NTBs’ coverage for all goods in the sixteen industrial countries 
increased by  1.5 percentage points  between  1981 and  1983. To  the 
extent that these NTBs increase, or even are maintained at their current 
levels, it will become very difficult, if not impossible, for Latin Amer- 
ican countries to increase their exports at the rate required to solve 
Table 1.27  Estimated Total Rates of Protection for Some Argentinian  and 
Brazilian Exports,  1980 (percentage) 
EEC  Japan  USA 
Argentina 
Fresh meat (01  I) 
Wheat (041) 
Corn (044) 
Textile fibers (26) 
Hides (61  I) 
Steel (67) 
Garments (84) 
118  328  46 
120  I45  0 
63  n.a.  10 
59  13  68 
18  25  5 
43  8  35 
59  18  79 
Brazil 
Fresh meat (01  I)  I18  328  46 
Sugar and honey (061)  160  44  27 
Coffee and derivatives (071)  93  161  39 
Cocoa (072)  I2  I73  4 
Textiles (65)  59  13  68 
Footwear (851)  27  16  9 
Soirrw: CEPAL 1986e. 
Norr: The numbers in parentheses refer to the SlTC  classification. Total rate of protection 
iz defined as tariff rate plus tariff equivalent of  NTBs. 43  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
the current debt crisis. While the main responsibility  for increasing 
exports rests with the Latin American countries, their efforts, no matter 
how serious, can be easily frustrated by the protectionist policies of 
the industrialized world.26 
1.5  Commercial Policies, Protectionism, and Latin American Trade 
1.5.1  Historical Perspective 
As noted in section 1.2, during the 1940s most of the Latin American 
countries embarked on ambitious industrialization programs based on 
an import substitution development strategy. This inward-looking de- 
velopment program was based on the idea that small developing econ- 
omies would only grow sufficiently rapidly if they were able to develop 
a large and diversified industrial sector. This, in turn, could only be 
achieved if  sufficiently high protection in the form of import tariffs or 
quotas was granted to the incipient domestic industries. Most propo- 
nents of the import substitution strategy also pointed out that the high 
degree of protection would only be necessary as a temporary measure; 
after an initial learning period these “infant  industries”  would move 
into their “adolescence” and would not require tariffs (Prebisch 1984). 
Reality, however, showed this view to be wrong. In a way, protection- 
ism became a semipermanent feature of the Latin American economies. 
During the first years of the industrialization process, a number of 
the larger countries’ important heavy industries were created, as the 
bases for a manufacturing  sector were  set. However, alongside the 
industrialization process, an impressive array of restrictions, controls, 
and often contradictory regulations evolved. In fact, thanks to these 
import restrictions many of the domestic industries were able to sur- 
vive.  For example, a number of  comparative studies have indicated 
that some of the Latin American countries (e.g., Chile) had for a long 
time one of the highest, and more variable, structures of protection in 
the developing world. As a consequence, many (if not most) of the 
industries created under the import substitution strategy were quite 
inefficient. In an empirical study directed by Krueger (1980), it was 
found that in Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay this inward-looking strat- 
egy resulted in  the use  of  very capital intensive techniques,  which 
hampered the creation of employment, among other inefficiencies. 
As in most historical cases, the Latin American import substitution 
strategy was accompanied by an acutely overvalued domestic currency 
which precluded the development of a vigorous nontraditional export 
sector. In particular, in many of these countries the agricultural sector 
was seriously harmed by the real exchange rate overvaluation. In fact 
in many cases the lagging of  agriculture became one of the most no- 
ticeable symptoms of Latin America’s economic problems of the 1960s. 44  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0. EnderdJesus Silva-Herzog 
During the early and mid-1960s the import substitution strategy began 
to run out of  steam. At that time, most of the easy and obvious sub- 
stitutions of imported goods had already taken place, and the process 
was rapidly becoming less dynamic (Furtado 1969). 
Starting in the late 1960s, and during most of the 1970s, most coun- 
tries made some movements toward rationalizing their external sectors 
via the reduction in coverage of quantitative restrictions and reduction 
in the average level of tariffs. In many cases these liberalization efforts 
were accompanied by active policies aimed at promoting exports. In 
a number of countries these export promotion schemes were based on 
an active management of the nominal exchange rate, aimed at avoiding 
overvaluation, and thus helped maintain a steady growth in exports. 
The Colombian experience is particularly interesting. After decades 
of an almost chaotic external sector policy-where  exchange rate crises 
were the norm rather than the exception-in  1967 the Colombian gov- 
ernment implemented a series of  measures aimed at encouraging ex- 
ports and at reducing the extent of protectionism. The exchange rate 
was devalued significantly,  and a crawling peg system based on periodic 
adjustments of the nominal exchange rate was adopted. At the same 
time the percentage of commodities subject to prior import licensing 
was  drastically  reduced,  as were  the average levels  of  tariffs.  The 
exchange rate and import liberalization  policies were  supplemented 
with  a dynamic export subsidies  scheme (the so-called CATS). The 
Colombian experience was in many ways a big success. Exports soared, 
new efficient industries were developed, and the external sector stayed 
extremely healthy, to the extent that Colombia was the only country 
among the large and medium Latin American nations not affected in a 
traumatic way by the debt 
Undoubtedly, the most ambitious attempts to liberalize the external 
sector took place in the Southern Cone during the late 1970s. Starting 
around 1975, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay embarked on major pro- 
grams to reform their economies. These cases were particularly inter- 
esting since the reforms implemented corresponded  closely to what 
many economists have been advocating for a long time: quantitative 
restrictions on trade were eliminated, tariff levels and dispersion were 
reduced, domestic capital markets were developed, and restrictions on 
international capital movements  were  lifted.  The main  objective of 
these refoms was to transform these countries into open export-oriented 
economies. 
A decade after these reforms were first implemented, the evidence 
indicates that they were to a large extent failures. In all three countries 
the liberalization  reforms  have been  partially reversed.  Tariffs have 
been raised, so that these economies are tending once again to become 
less integrated with the rest of the world. Severe financial crises re- 
sulted in the collapse and virtual nationalization of the banking sectors. 45  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
Although this is still an area of debate, it is possible to argue that the 
failure of these liberalizations was, to a large extent (but not exclu- 
sively), due to the implementation  of  inappropriate macroeconomic 
policies, including wage rate and exchange rate policies. Also, the way 
in  which the financial reforms  were implemented-with  little or no 
supervision on behalf of  the authorities-played  an important role in 
the final disappointing outcome. 
A major indirect negative effect of the failure of the Southern Cone 
experiences is that they have generated a bad press for import liber- 
alization and market-oriented policies in the rest of  the region. The 
collapse of  these economies, the financial scandals, and the reversal 
of  the policies have given ammunition to those who, on political or 
other grounds, oppose economic liberalization and tariff reform as a 
development strategy. 
1.5.2  Tariffs and “True Protection” 
Table 1.28 contains data on nominal and effective rates of protection 
for selected Latin American countries.28  Although these data refer to 
only a handful of  countries, and in some cases to quite a few years 
back, they give a flavor of  the extent and evolution of protectionism 
in the region. First, the effective rates of protection (or protection to 
value-added) are extremely high. This is especially the case in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Second, for the cases of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, 
and Uruguay, these figures reflect vividly the move toward tariff lib- 
eralization that took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
What is not reflected in this table, however, is the post-debt-crisis 
(i.e., post-1982)  generalized movement toward greater protection in the 
region. As these countries were forced to reduce imports and improve 
their external balance, they hiked their tariffs fairly significantly and 
imposed other forms of import controls. Even Chile, under the super- 
open-economy approach of Pinochet, responded to the crisis by (tem- 
porarily?) increasing tariffs by more than 50 percent in  1983 (see Ed- 
wards and Edwards 1987, 126-29). 
Tariffs, of course, constitute only one form of protection, and coun- 
tries in fact use many other mechanisms to introduce de facto wedges 
between domestic and world prices. As discussed in section 1.3, non- 
tariff barriers (NTBs) can take many different forms ranging from prior 
deposits to outright quotas. The history of  nontariff barriers in Latin 
America is long. As a number of  authors have pointed  out, import 
licenses, prior import deposits, and quotas have been generalized in 
these countries. Not surprisingly, use of nontariff barrier mechanisms 
increased significantly after the debt crisis (Cepal 1986f). In Colombia, 
for example, the proportion of imports subject to an import license 
increased from 47 percent in 1980 to 66 percent in 1983 (see Edwards 
1983). 46  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0. Enders/Jesus Silva-Herzog 
Table 1.28  Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection in  Selective Latin 
American Countries 
Nominal  Effective Rate 
Rate  of Protection 



































































Sources: Argentina: Cavallo and Cotani 1986; Brazil: Carvalho and Haddad 1981; Chile: 
Edwards and Edwards 1987; Colombia: Edwards 1983; Peru: Nogues  1986; Uruguay: 
Favaro and Spiller 1986. 
Unfortunately the data available on NTBs in the developing coun- 
tries, and in particular in Latin America, are exceedingly sketchy. In 
fact, as far as I know it is not possible to find, for Latin America, data 
on the coverage of  NTBs which would be equivalent to the data pre- 
sented in section 1.4. However, a recent study by ALADI (1984) pro- 
vides some indication of the coverage of two forms of NTBs: outright 
prohibitions  and prior import licenses. Table  1.29 summarizes these 
data. As can be seen from this table, NTBs are as prevalent in Latin 
America as in the developed countries, if not more so. 
Multiple exchange rates are another mechanism used extensively by 
the Latin American nations to impede trade flows. Interestingly, studies 
on  NTBs  have not focused on  this  protective  tool.  In  section  1.6, 
however, we look into this problem in more detail. 
The lack of  reliable data on NTBs has generally frustrated analysts 
trying to assess with some rigor the extent of  protection in the devel- 
oping world. For this reason, in a recent massive cross-country study 47  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
Table 1.29  Coverage of  Some Nontariff Barriers in Selected Latin American 
Countries, 1983 
Percent of  Import 
Items Subject to  Items Subject 
Outright Prohibition  to Import Licenses 





































Source: ALADI 1984. 
undertaken at the World Bank, an effort to construct subjective “in- 
dexes  of  liberalization”  was  made.  These indexes are supposed to 
capture the extent of trade impediments, including tariffs and other 
NTBs. They are subjective in the sense that they do not combine actual 
objective measures. Although there are some shortcomings related to 
this  subjectivity, including the nonverifiability and noncomparability 
across countries, their construction has been extremely useful in help- 
ing to understand the evolution of  “true protectionism”  in some of 
these countries. For the five Latin American nations included among 
the eighteen countries covered by the study, the indexes reflect the 
protectionist history of these countries as well as the efforts toward 
liberalization implemented in the late 1970s and early  1980s (see Mi- 
chaely, Papageorgiou, and Choksi 1986). 
1.6  Latin America’s Exchange Rate Policies and the External Sector 
This section briefly analyzes the exchange rate policies of the Latin 
American countries, placing special emphasis on two issues: (a) real 
exchange rate  overvaluation, and (b)  the protective role of multiple 
and parallel (or black) market exchange rates. The evolution of  the 
external sector can be affected in several ways by the evolution of the 
real exchange rate.29 For example, real exchange rate misalignment, 48  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0. Enders/Jesus Silva-Herzog 
and especially an overvalued real exchange rate, greatly harms export 
performance (and in particular nontraditional exports) and encourages 
capital flight. On the other hand a highly volatile real exchange rate 
enhances uncertainty,  tending to reduce and even mislocate  invest- 
mente30 
1.6.1  Exchange Rate Policies, the Dollar, and Real Exchange Rates 
During the last thirteen years or so, the Latin American countries 
have followed the most  diverse nominal exchange rate policies,  in- 
cluding fixed to  the dollar, crawling peg (i.e., periodic  adjustments 
approximately  determined by  the differential between  domestic and 
world inflation), periodic devaluations, preannounced declining rate of 
nominal devaluation, and so on. Surprisingly perhaps, in spite of these 
different policies, during the late 1970s and early 1980s a large number 
of countries experienced significant real appreciations, which led to 
acute overvaluation of their c~rrencies.~' 
In general, it is possible to single out three main causes of  these 
fairly generalized movements toward real overvaluation: Many of these 
countries pursued expansive monetary and fiscal policies that became 
incompatible with the nominal exchange rate regime chosen (i.e., Mex- 
ico, Peru, Argentina). In this case, the loose macropolicies resulted in 
expansions of aggregate demand, which exercised upward pressure on 
domestic prices. As prices increased at a rate higher than the nominal 
rate of devaluation (which under fixed nominal rates is zero), the real 
exchange rate appreciated and the country's exports became less com- 
petitive in international markets. A second cause of  real appreciation, 
which affected mainly the Southern Cone countries, was the adoption 
of  preannounced declining devaluation schedules, which started at rates 
below the ongoing rate of inflation (i.e., the rabliras). The combination 
of these tablitas with other policies, such as backward wage indexation 
in  Chile and relaxation  of  capital  controls in  Argentina, Chile,  and 
Uruguay, conspired to generate significant real appreciations in these 
three countries (Edwards 1984). A final and important factor that con- 
tributed to the loss in the region's competitiveness was the significant 
appreciation of  the dollar in international  financial markets between 
1980 and 1985. Most of the Latin American countries either peg their 
nominal exchange rate to the U.S. dollar or use the dollar as a term 
of  reference to conduct their exchange rate policy. Consequently, as 
the dollar appreciated in the international financial markets with respect 
to other industrial countries' currencies, so did most of the Latin Amer- 
ican currencie~.~~ 
Figures  1.4- 1.7 depict the behavior of  two indexes of the real ex- 
change rate for Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru, and Mexico. 
These indexes were constructed using quarterly data and in most cases 49  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
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Fig. 1.4  Brazil. Real exchange rate: e  = E*CPl(world)/CPl(home) 
(1980 = 100). 
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Fig. 1.5  Chile. Real  exchange rate: e  = E*CPl(world)/CPl(home) 
(1980 = 100). 
cover up to mid-1983 or early  1984. The average for 1980 is equal to 
In these diagrams an increase in the indexes reflects real depre- 
ciation, while a decline in the index denotes real appreciation or loss 
of  international competitiveness. The first index is the traditional bi- 
lateral real exchange rate computed with respect to the U.S. dollar and 
is called “off bilateral”  in the diagrams. The second index, called “off 
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Mexico. Real exchange rate: e = E*CPl(wotld)/CPl(home) 
(1980 = 100). 
the changes in international competitiveness relative to a group of  its 
ten most important trade partners.  In this way this multilateral real 
exchange rate  index is  able to take  into account the way  in  which 
fluctuations among the partners'  exchange rates  affect  international 
competitiveness. 
These diagrams neatly reflect some of the features of real exchange 
behavior discussed earlier. First, in all countries we observe that in the 
mid- to late  1970s  a process  of  real  appreciation,  which entailed a 51  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
reduction in  the countries’ degree of  international competitiveness, 
took place. While in some cases this declining trend in the RER was 
reversed in the early  1980s (Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico) via nominal 
devaluations, in others (Paraguay, El Salvador) it continued until at 
least  1984. These diagrams also reflect in a nice way the differences 
between bilateral and multilateral real exchange rates, as well as the 
effects of  the dollar appreciation in the first half of the 1980s. Notice 
that in all countries  after  1980  the multilateral  index declines (i.e., 
appreciates) much  faster than  the bilateral  rate, indicating that  the 
degree of “true” overvaluation-which  takes into account changes in 
the degree of competitiveness relative to all trade partners-was  much 
greater than that computed with respect to the U.S. dollar only. 
1.6.2  Multiple Exchange Rates, Parallel Markets, and Protectionism 
in Latin America 
In many cases nonunified exchange rates play an important protec- 
tive role. To the extent that two types of international transactions are 
subject to different rates of exchange, a wedge between their prices 
that acts in the same way as a tax will be imp0sed.3~  Moreover, multiple 
exchange rates for commercial transactions will have an effect equiv- 
alent to import tariffs (or export taxes), since the domestic public will 
have to pay a higher price for those imports subject to a higher exchange 
rate. 
For the exchange rate system to play a protective role, the authorities 
need not officially adopt multiple rates. In fact, a parallel market for 
foreign exchange will usually also have a protective effect. Generally 
speaking, in  many  cases marginal imports  will  be  brought  into the 
country at the higher parallel market (or free) exchange rate.35 
The Latin American countries have had a long tradition with multiple 
exchange rates.  In  many  cases-as  in  Argentina  and  Colombia for 
example-a  lower rate has been applied to traditional exports as an 
implicit way of  taxing them. Also, in  many countries, and for long 
periods of  time, different rates have been applied to commercial and 
financial transactions. Perhaps the most extreme case is that of Chile 
in 1972, when fifteen different “official” exchange rates were in effect. 
In fact in the 1980s multiple rates have become such a commonplace 
that in  1983 all but three of  the Latin American countries for which 
there are data had two or more official exchange rates. While in many 
of these countries multiple rates have been a long-term feature (Ar- 
gentina, Colombia, Paraguay, Ecuador), in many others they have only 
made an appearance (or reappearance) in the early  1980s, usually as 
part of the packages aimed at dealing with the debt and economic crisis 
(i.e., Chile, Venezuela, Dominican Republic). This profusion of mul- 
tiple official rates as well as the significant parallel market premiums 52  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0. EnderdJesus Silva-Herzog 
observed in many of  these countries indicate that the extent of pro- 
tection in Latin America is generally higher than what data on tariffs, 
or even import licenses and quotas, would suggest. 
1.7  Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America 
For many years, direct foreign investment has been a controversial 
issue in  Latin America.  Most countries in  the region have carefully 
regulated the conditions under which direct foreign investment can take 
place, and have determined with even greater care regulations  that 
govern profits repatriation, reinvestment, transfer pricing, and so on. 
Moreover, in a number of countries regulations establish a time limit 
after which any foreign investment should be “nationalized,”  with at 
least 51 percent of  the equity belonging to locals. Perhaps the most 
severe of these regulations  regarding direct foreign investment was 
contained in article 24  of the Cartegena Agreement which governed 
the functioning of the Andean Pact.36  According to this regulation, any 
foreign  investment  had  to  be  nationalized  before fifteen years  had 
elapsed. 
Latin  America’s  attitude  toward  foreign investment  has  in  many 
instances been discriminatory and sector-specific; while direct foreign 
investment is welcomed in some sectors, it is completely kept out of 
other so-called strategic areas. Good examples of this type of policy 
are the Brazilian and Mexican rejections of recent proposals to develop 
U.S.-owned computer manufactures in those countries.37  Also the in- 
corporation in the Chilean constitution of state ownership of all major 
copper (and other) mines is striking.38 
In spite of  the “suspicious”  attitude with which many of the Latin 
American countries have faced the subject, direct foreign investment 
in the region has continued to be substantial, with the United States 
as the principal actor. Table 1.30 contains the latest available data on 
the accumulated value of  direct foreign investment in Latin America 
by country of origin. Although these data-as  is much of the infor- 
mation on direct foreign investment in the region-are  highly incom- 
plete, they reflect two interesting facts. First, the United States plays 
a very dominant role in the area. Second, as far as this information 
shows, the relative importance of the United States declined between 
1976 and  1981. In fact, according to the data the U.S.  share in  the 
accumulated value of foreign direct investment fluctuated around 63- 
64  percent between  1967 and  1978; in  1981, the last year for which 
there are data, this share was only 54 percent. 
Betwen  1982 and  1984 there was  no  change in  the value of U.S. 
investments in the region. However,  1983 was a year of a fairly im- 
portant net disinvestment, concentrated almost exclusively in Vene- Table 1.30  Accumulated Value of Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America by Country of 
Origin (millions of  U.S. dollars) 
1967  I976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1984 
U.S.  11,777  23,934  27,514  32,662  35,056  38,882  38,864  28,094 
Japan  403  3,301  3,757  4,373  5,OOO  6,168  n.a.  n.a. 
Germany (FR)  753  3,494  4,381  4,674  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
U.K.  1,228  n.a.  n.a.  1,995  ma.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Canada  1,093  2,287  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
OECD Total  18,453  37,740  43,293  50,550  n.a.  n.a.  71,800  n.a. 
ALADI  n.a.  n.a.  ma.  n.a.  n.a.  590  654  n.a. 
Source: CEPAL 1986b. 54  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0.  EnderdJesus Silva-Herzog 
zuela. In 1984 there was a net positive investment of almost the same 
value as the drop of  1983. However, the geographical as well as the 
sector composition  changed  drastically.  While investments in  Vene- 
zuela were minimal in 1984, they surged in Brazil. Also, oil saw a big 
dip in 1984, with manufactures and commerce experiencing important 
increases. 
Undoubtedly, the economic and political uncertainties of the last few 
years in Latin America have dictated the relative stagnation of U.S. 
investment flows into the region. On the other hand, abundant natural 
resources and substantial labor cost differentials still make the region 
a very attractive place for U.S.  and other multinationals to locate. For 
example, the data in  figure  1.8 suggest that the relative  differential 
between U.S. and local labor costs has widened since the mid-1970~.3~ 
In  the aftermath of  the debt crisis, direct foreign investment will 
probably become very important for the Latin American countries. For 
a number of years to come the region will not be able to obtain abundant 
(or even meager) funds from the international banking community, or 
from the flotation of bonds. Consequently, additional funds to finance 
increased capital accumulation and the resumption of growth will have 
to come from other sources. Of course, the natural alternative sources 
of funds to finance investment are (a)  increased domestic savings (both 
private and public), (b)  reversal of the massive capital flight that took 
place in the early 1980~,~O  (c)  increased funds obtained from multilateral 
organizations  such as the World Bank and the Interamerican Devel- 
opment Bank, and (6)  increased direct investment. 
Whether these potential sources of additional foreign funds will ac- 
tually become available will depend on a series of factors, including 
4t 
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Fig. 1.8  Wages in manufacturing for the United States and five Latin 
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the countries’ domestic policies. However, with respect to direct for- 
eign investment, substantial increases in the flow of funds will require 
fairly creative policies by the Latin American  countries that would 
encourage these additional funds from abroad, while at the same time 
would allow these countries to maintain their main development and 
“national objectives.”  An interesting possibility would be to link any 
efforts to attract new direct foreign investment to the opening up of 
the “services  sector.”  For example, in 1984 the United States’ accu- 
mulated direct investment in the commercial banks, finance, insurance, 
and  real estate sectors was  only  11.9 percent  of  the total of  these 
 investment^.^^ 
1.8  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have analyzed in detail a number of different aspects 
related to the evolution and recent behavior  of  U.S. trade relations 
with the Latin American countries. In this section I wrap up the analysis 
by summarizing the findings and by discussing the possible future evo- 
lution of U.S.-Latin  American trade relations. The main conclusions 
of this study are the following: 
1. When market import shares (computed using U.S. dollar values 
of imports) are used as an indicator of competitiveness, there is no 
evidence of a loss in the U.S. degree of competitiveness in Latin Amer- 
ica in the last fifteen years or so. In fact, the statistical analysis of the 
existing empirical evidence shows that there has been no significant 
change in the U.S. share of the aggregate Latin American import mar- 
ket since 1970. 
2.  At the individual country level, however, there have been some 
changes. In nine countries, the U.S. share of  imports has not changed 
significantly; in two it has increased; and in five, including Nicaragua, 
there has been a decline. 
3.  Although at the overall aggregate level there have been no sig- 
nificant changes in the degree of U.S. competitiveness in Latin Amer- 
ica, there  have been  substantial changes in  what the United  States 
exports to these countries. There has been a very important increase 
in Latin American imports of primary products and of chemicals from 
the United States, with a decline in imports of other (traditional) man- 
ufactured goods, Thus, there has been an increase in the “degree of 
competitiveness”  of  U.S. primary  products  and chemicals  in  Latin 
America,  accompanied with a loss in  competitiveness of  traditional 
manufacturing sectors. 
4.  Although the share of the United States in total Latin American 
imports has not changed, the (real) dollar value of U.S. exports to the 
region has declined very significantly in the last three or four years. 
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region has gone through major-and  in some cases highly innovative- 
adjustment programs, which have resulted in important reductions in 
total imports. For the region as a whole, the real value of aggregate 
imports declined by more than 45 percent between 1980 and 1985. 
5. The reduction in the real value of Latin America’s imports in the 
last years was a result of the contractionary demand policies imple- 
mented in many countries, of  important (real) exchange rate adjust- 
ments, and of  the imposition in many cases of fairly massive import 
controls. These import controls-which  take many forms, including 
higher tariffs, more generalized NTBs, multiple exchange rates, and 
parallel exchange rates-mark  an important turn from a liberalizing 
trend observed, since the mid-l970s, in most countries in the region. 
It is clear that this mode of Latin American adjustment is not sustain- 
able in the long run. The resumption of  growth will require a ration- 
alization of the external sector and an increase in imports and in exports. 
6. In terms of foreign competition, Japan has not experienced any 
significant increases in its presence in the Latin American import mar- 
ket. At the manufactured goods level, the drop in the U.S. share has 
been picked up by other NICs (i.e., Korea, Taiwan) and especially by 
intra-Latin  American  trade.  In fact, CEPAL/ECLA projects  a sub- 
stantial increase in overall intraregional trade for the next years (CE- 
PAL  1986~).  For example, in July  1986 CEPAL/ECLA projected that 
the share of intra-ALADI imports would increase from 16 percent in 
1985 to 18.6 percent in 1990 and to 22.2 percent in  1994. Naturally, if 
this  happens,  other countries’  shares, including the  United  States’, 
would decline. Although we cannot discard ECLA’s projections cas- 
ually, their numbers are possibly on the high side, since they are based 
on the (fairly unlikely) assumption of “dedollarization” of the interre- 
gional trade. 
7.  A remarkable fact, surprisingly not widely known, is that prac- 
tically all of  the recent adjustment has come through a reduction  in 
imports, with the real value of exports having declined in many of these 
countries, mainly as a result of the reduction of prices of commodity 
exports. 
8. The recovery  of  the  Latin American  economy w-ill require an 
increase in exports and a rationalization of these nations’ import sector, 
via reduced protection and increased efficiency. This rationalization 
and easing of the current high levels of import restrictions will probably 
come about slowly. It is highly likely that these countries will proceed 
cautiously, avoiding this time around the errors and mistakes  of  the 
recent  Southern Cone liberalization.  Special care will  be  placed  on 
avoiding exchange rate overvaluation. 
9.  A sustained increase in Latin America’s exports-which  is, of 
course, a prerequisite for an increase in its imports-requires  a number 
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for these goods by the developed world. In fact, it has been recently 
estimated that an average increase in industrial countries’ GDP of ap- 
proximately 3 percent per annum will be “required”  during the next 
years (Balassa et al. 1986). Second, increased efficiency in the regional 
productive process must occur; this could be achieved via a generalized 
increase in efficiency, including the rationalization of the external sec- 
tor. Also, real exchange rate  overvaluation must be  avoided.  More 
important, the current protectionist trend in the industrial countries 
must be reversed. 
10. The data presented in  this paper indicate that at this time the 
extent of nontariff barriers, as a form of protection in the industrial 
countries,  is  very  significant.  Moreover,  the  data  show  that  these 
NTBs  are particularly  important for goods originating in  the devel- 
oping nations and that their tariff equivalents are in many cases very 
significant. 
11. Although the United States is still the most important country 
regarding direct investment in Latin America, its relative importance 
has  declined  in  recent  years.  Since  1981  the accumulated value  of 
U.S.  investment  in  Latin  America  has  not  changed.  However,  its 
sectoral and geographical composition has changed, with oil and com- 
merce  being negatively affected. Both  because of  its  resources and 
labor  costs, Latin America continues to be an attractive  region for 
foreign investors. Moreover, in the aftermath of the debt crisis, direct 
foreign investment has  become  one  of  the few  possible  sources of 
foreign funds to finance capital accumulation and growth in the region. 
Whether  significant investments will  materialize  will  depend on ex- 
pected economic and political stability and on innovative changes in 
local regulations. 
The evidence examined in this paper suggests that the United States’ 
overall competitive position in Latin America has not changed signif- 
icantly in  the last fifteen years or so. At the sectoral level, however, 
the composition of  U.S.  exports to Latin America has changed, re- 
flecting a changing pattern of U.S. comparative advantage: chemicals 
and primary products have increased their shares, with traditional man- 
ufactures hurting. Foreign competition in Latin America is not coming 
from Japan but from other NICs, and, more important, from intra- 
Latin American trade. As a result of the debt crisis the value of Latin 
American imports has greatly declined, bringing down with it the value 
of U.S. exports to the region. As imports recover and move toward 
their peak (real) value, the United States will also increase its exports 
to the region. How will the recovery of imports be financed? Possibly, 
in  part by higher exports-this  in turn requires steady growth in the 
industrial world and an end to the protectionist mood-and  in part 
through new funds made available by increased direct foreign invest- 
ment. 58  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0. EnderdJesus Silva-Herzog 
Appendix 
Table l.A.1  Regressions Results for U.S. Import Market Shares in  Siteen Latin 
American Countries; 1970-83 
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Notes: The regression run was the following log share, = a0  + a,  TIME + a2 log USRER, 
+ a3  log USRER,-  + )L,.  The data on real exchange rates correspond to (the inverse) of 
the IMF MERM indexes. 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; D.W. is the Durbin-Watson statistic; R2  is the 
coefficient of determination.  All asterisks mean that the coefficient is significant. 59  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
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1.  These are the countries for which  disaggregated  data on directions  of 
trade are available. 
2. On the evolution of  Latin America’s external sector see, for example, 
Furtado 1969. On Latin America and the Great Depression see Diaz-Alejandro 
1982 and 1983, and Maddison  1985. On the development strategies in  Latin 
America, see Corbo 1986. 
3.  See, for example, the discussion in Furtado 1969. 
4. On the Southern Cone see, for example, Calvo 1986; Corbo 1985; Hanson 
and de Melo 1985; Edwards 1985; and Edwards and Edwards 1987. 
5.  An important issue concerns to which external price index should be used 
to compute the evolution of the real value of imports and exports. The figure 
quoted earlier was calculated using the U.S. CPI. If the wholesale price index 
for the industrialized countries as a whole, as computed by the IMF, is used 
instead, Latin American imports declined by 49 percent on real terms between 
1980 and 1985. 
6. In some of these countries imports had also grown at a fantastically high 
pace between  1975 and 1980 (i.e., the Southern Cone countries). Notice, how- 
ever, that for the fourteen countries as a whole, the real value of  imports grew 
at a slower rate during 1975-80  than in the period  1965-75. 
7. However, both the trade-GDP and the import-GDP ratios exhibit quite a 
bit of fluctuation from year to year. To get a sense of  the general trend in the 
degree of openness, regressions  of the log of  both of these indexes on time 
were run for the period  1960-83.  The results show that in the great majority 
of these countries, openness increased during this period. 
8. The decline of the trade ratio, however, is less marked than that of the 
imports ratio. The reason is that as a result of the adjustment program in some 
of these countries, exports increased during the period. 
9. On the constant-market-share criterion for assessing the degree of inter- 
national competitiveness,  see Learner and Stern 1970. 
10. This can be illustrated using the following example. Assume that a par- 
ticular Latin American country imports goods from the United States and the 
rest of the world. The quantities imported are MUs amd MR  respectively. The 
price of imports from the United States is PUS, while the price of imports from 
R, expressed in U.S. dollars,  is EPR,  where E is the nominal exchange rate 
between the United States and the rest, and PR is the price of  MR  in the rest 
of the world currency. Our market share then is equal to s = [PUsMUS/(PuSMUS 
+ PREMR)].  This can be rewritten as s = [MuS/(MuS + (EPR/Pus)MR)].  Notice 
that [(EPRPS)]  is the real value of  the dollar. Clearly, then, even if  MUS  and 
MR-the  quantities imported-remain  constant, changes in (ERR/PUS)  will af- 
fect s. 
11. In Argentina, Chile, Venezuela,  Peru, and El Salvador the U.S. share 
exhibited a slight increase  between  1977  and  1982; in Brazil,  Paraguay,  and 
Nicaragua there  was somewhat  of  a decline during the same period.  In the 60  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0. EndedJesus Silva-Herzog 
other countries the U.S. share fluctuated  around a fairly  stable value during 
12. The coefficient for the time trend turned  out to be  -0.004  with a t- 
statistic  of -  1.2. In  fact, Nicaragua  is  the only country with  a  significant 
increase in imports from the Soviet bloc during the 1980s. 
13. Due to space considerations, detailed data for the rest of the countries 
are not provided here.  However, these data are available from the author on 
request. 
14. Given the different sources (IMF and ECLA) there are some (minor) 
divergences between  these figures and those in tables 2.1-2.4.  See CEPAL 
1985 and 1986d. 
15. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that, in general, a country will tend 
to export those goods whose production process is intensive in the factor that 
the country has in relative abundance (see Leamer 1984). Notice that Learner’s 
study covers only up to 1975. The data presented  here, then, confirms that 
Learner’s results are also valid for the more recent period. 
1977-8 1. 
16. This classification corresponds to ECLA. 
17. This of  course is consistent with the shift in the U.S. comparative ad- 
vantage detected above and documented in the previous subsection. 
18. In not all countries, however, did the real value of exports decline during 
this period.  In Brazil, Ecuador,  and  Mexico, for example, the real value of 
exports was significantly higher in  1985 than  in 1980. In both cases the real 
value of  imports and exports were computed using the data in tables 1.2 and 
1.3 and the U.S.  WPI as a price  deflator for the nominal  dollar values.  If, 
however, the wholesale price index for the industrialized countries as a whole 
is used as the deflator, real exports of these thirteen countries have declined 
by almost 18 percent. 
19.  For a comprehensive discussion on the role of exports in the recovery 
of  Latin America, see the analysis in Balassa et al. 1986. Even in those quarters 
where traditionally there has been skepticism regarding the role of trade, there 
is now agreement on the importance of exports expansion in the next decade 
or so. 
20.  See, however,  section  1.7 for a  discussion  on alternative  sources of 
financing of new imports. 
21.  As in the case of imports, these shares have been computed by dividing 
the dollar value of exports to a particular country by the total dollar value of 
exports. 
22.  Another interesting  regularity  is  that the relative  importance of  fuel 
exports (category 3) increased dramatically during the period. This rapid growth, 
of course, reflects increases in both oil prices (notice, for example, the jump 
of this share in  1979) and oil production. Naturally, the recent decline in the 
price of oil has had the opposite effect on these shares. 
23.  See Balassa and Balassa  1984; Cline  1985; Jones  1983; and  Nogues, 
Olechowski, and Winters 1986a and 1986b. 
24.  Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, the 
United  Kingdom, Australia,  Austria, Finland,  Japan, Norway,  Switzerland, 
and the United States. 
25.  Since the numerator in this index is actual imports, its value will tend 
to be biased  downward.  For this  reason  Nogues,  Olechowski,  and  Winters 
construct alternative  indexes, which  is pretty  much  the same story as that 
presented here. 
26.  In fact, in their recent blueprint for Latin American recovery,  Balassa 
et al.  1986 stress that it is crucial that the industrialized countries avoid any 61  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
new import protection  or export subsidization,  “indeed  [what is required is] 
a renewal of trade liberalization”  (p. 34). In that regard, the U.S.  1984 Trade 
and Tariff Act allows for the possibility of implementing a series of protectionist 
measures. For an analysis of the act from a Latin American perspective, see 
Rodriguez-Mendoz 1986. 
27. Of course, the coffee boom of  1975-79  and the boom in  illegal drug- 
related trade also helped. On coffee and the Colombian economy see Edwards 
1983. On the Colombian external sector see Diaz-Alejandro 1976 and Thomas 
1986. 
28.  The effective rate of  protection  is a measure of the relative degree of 
inefficiency of domestic production relative to international production. A pos- 
itive value means that domestic value-added for that particular activity exceeds 
value-added at international prices. The effective tariff for good i (7;) is com- 
puted as  T~ = (ti -  Zot,)/(l -  Z,J,  where ti  is the nominal tariff, aU  is the input/ 
output coefficient between input j and good  i,  and tj  is the nominal tariff on 
inputj. Notice that if  the good and all inputs have the same nominal tariff, 
then the effective and nominal rates of protection are the same (7;  = ti). 
29. The real exchange rate is a measure of the international competitiveness 
of a country and is defined as RER = EP*/P,  where E is the nominal exchange 
rate, and P*  and P are foreign and domestic price levels. An increase in RER 
represents a real depreciation and reflects an increase in competitiveness. 
30.  On  the effects of  real  exchange  rate overvaluation  in  the developing 
countries, see, for example, Phefferman  1985. On overvaluation  and capital 
flight, see Cuddington 1986. A series of essays on exchange rates in developing 
countries can be found in Edwards and Ahamed 1986. 
3 1. Notice that since overvaluation is defined as a (significant) discrepancy 
between the actual and equilibrium real exchange rate, not all real appreciation 
necessarily reflects a situation of overvaluation. It is possible that the equilib- 
rium real exchange rate appreciates. For a fuller discussion see Edwards 1987. 
32.  Balassa et al.  1986, for example, considers the dollar appreciation epi- 
sode of  1982-85  as an important determinant of the debt crisis. 
33.  For a detailed discussion on the construction of these indexes, see Ed- 
wards and Ng 1985. 
34. This is an extensive technical literature on multiple exchange rates. See, 
for example, Dornbusch 1986a. 
35.  For a general discussion on the role of multiple and parallel rates in the 
developing countries, see Dornbusch 1986a and 1986b, and Edwards 1987. 
36.  Even the ultra-free-market-oriented Pinochet government in Chile showed 
apprehension  regarding direct foreign investment when the Mining Law was 
enacted. See Estudios Publicos, Summer 1986. 
37.  On the Brazilian computer industry see Evans 1986. 
38.  The constitution allowed the state to grant concessions to foreign firms. 
The nature of  these concessions  was regulated by the Mining Law of  1979, 
which included an ingenious system for calculating indemnization in case of 
early termination of  the concessions. See Pinera 1986. 
39.  Of course these comparisons  are highly sensitive to the exchange rate 
used. To the extent that the Latin American countries succeed in avoiding real 
overvaluation, their  real  wages  will  remain  relatively  low  by  international 
comparisons. 
40.  On the extent of capital flight see, for example, Cuddington 1986. 
41.  This is significantly below its 1977 share of 25 percent. 62  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0.  Enders/Jesus Silva-Herzog 
References 
ALADI.  1984. Elementos de juicio para el  establecimiento  de un programa 
para la eliminacion de restricciones no arancelarias. Caracas, Venezuela. 
Balassa,  B.,  and  C. Balassa.  1984. Industrial  protection  in  the developing 
countries.  World Economy (June): 179-96. 
Balassa,  B.,  G. M.  Bueno,  P.  P.  Kuczynski, and M.  H. Simoensen.  1986. 
Toward  renewed  economic growth  in  Latin America. Washington,  D.C.: 
Institute of International Economics. 
Blejer, M. 1984. Economic integration: An  analytical overview. In Economic 
and social progress in Latin America. Interamerica Development Bank. 
Calvo, G. 1986. Fractured liberalism: Argentina under Martinez de Hoz. Eco- 
nomic Development and Cultural Change, April. 
Carvalho, J., and C. Haddad. 1981. Foreign trade strategies and employment 
in Brazil. In A. 0. Krueger,  H. B.  Lary,  T.  Monson, and N. Akrasanee, 
eds., Trade and Employment in Developing Countries. Chicago: University 
of  Chicago Press. 
Cavallo,  D., and  J. Cotani.  1986. The timing  and  sequencing  of  economic 
liberalization: The case of Argentina. World Bank Typescript. 
CEPAL.  1985. Origen y destino del comercio exterior de 10s paises de la Aso- 
ciacion Latinoamericana de Integracion y del Mercado Comun Centroam- 
ericano. Cuadernos Estadisticos de la Cepal 9. Santiago, Chile. 
. 1986a. Anuario estadistico de la cepal. Santiago, Chile. 
-.  1986b. Banco de datos sobre inversiones extranjeras directa en Amer- 
ica Latina y el Caribe. September. 
. 1986~.  Cooperacidn comercial  y negociaciones regionales.  Santiago, 
Chile. July. 
. 1986d. Origen y destino de comercio exterior en 1983. Santiago, Chile. 
August. 
. 1986e. Relaciones economicas internacionales y cooperacidn de Amer- 
ica Latina y el Caribe. Santiago, Chile. May. 
. 1986f. Reorientacion del comercio exterior de productos basicos hacia 
America Latina. Santiago, Chile. June. 
Cline, W.  1985. Imports of manufactures from developing countries: Perfor- 
mance  and  prospects for market  access.  Washington,  D.C.:  Brookings 
Institution. 
Corbo, V.  1985. Chilean economic policy and international economic relations 
since 1970. In G. M. Walton, ed., The national economic policies of Chile. 
Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press. 
. 1986. Problems, development theory and strategies of Latin America. 
DRD Working Paper No.  190. World Bank. 
Cuddington, J. 1986. Capital flight from the developing countries. World Bank 
Typescript. 
Diaz-Alejandro, C. F.  1976. Colombia. New York: Columbia University Press. 
. 1982. Latin America in depression, 1929- 1939. In M. Gersovitz et al., 
eds., The theory and experience of  economic development. London: Allen 
and Unwin. 
. 1983. Stories of  the  1930s for the 1980s. In P.  Aspe Armella  et al., 
eds., Financial policies and the world capital market. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Dornbusch, R. 1986a. Multiple exchange rates for commercial transactions. In 
S.  Edwards and L. Ahamed, eds., Economic Adjustment  and Exchange 
Rates in Developing Countries. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 63  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
. 1986b. Special exchange rates for capital account transactions. World 
Bank Economic Review (September): 3-34. 
Edwards. S.  1983. The external sector in Columbia. Paper prepared for the 
World Bank. 
. 1984. The order of liberalization of the external sector in developing 
countries. Princeton Essays in International  Finance No.  156. 
. 1985. Stabilization with liberalization: An evaluation of the years of 
Chile’s experience with free market policies,  1973- 1983. Economic Devel- 
opment and Cultural Change, January. 
. 1987.  Exchange  rate misalignment  in  developing  countries. NBER 
Working Paper. 
Edwards, S., and L. Ahamed, eds. 1986. Economic adjustment and exchange 
rates in developing countries. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Edwards, S., and A. Cox Edwards. 1987. Monetarism and liberalization: The 
Chilean experiment. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 
Edwards. S., and F. Ng. 1985. Trends in real exchange rate behavior in selected 
developing countries. CPD Working Paper. World Bank. 
Evans, P.  B. 1986. State, capital, and the transformation of  dependence: The 
Brazilian computer case. World Development (July): 791 -800. 
Favaro, E., and P.  Spiller.  1986. The timing and sequencing of  economic lib- 
eralization: The case of Uruguay. World Bank Typescript. 
Furtado, C. 1969. La economia latinoamericana. Santiago, Ed. Universitaria. 
GATT.  1984. Report of  the group of quantitative  restrictions  and other non 
tariff barriers.  Geneva. 
Hanson, J., and J. de Melo.  1985.  External shocks, financial reforms, and 
stabilization  attempts in  Uruguay  during  1974- 1983.  World Development 
(August):  134-46. 
International Monetary Fund. Various issues. Directions of  trade. 
Jones, C. D. 1983. Visible imports subject to restraint. Government Economic 
Services WP No. 62. 
Krueger, A. 0. 1983. Trade and employment in developing countries: Synthesis 
and conclusions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Krueger, A. O., H. B. Lary, T. Monson, and N. Akrasanee, eds. 1980. Trade 
and  employment  in  developing  countries.  Vol.  1. Chicago:  University  of 
Chicago Press. 
Learner, E. E. 1984. Sources  of international comparative  advantage. Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Learner, E., and R. Stern. 1970. Quantitative international economics. Boston: 
Bycon Press. 
Maddison, A. 1985. Two crises: Latin American and Asia, 1929-38 and 1973- 
1983. Paris: OECD. 
Michaely, M., D. Papageorgiou, and A. Choksi.  1986. The phasing of  a trade 
liberalization policy: Preliminary evidence. Paper presented at AEA Meeting, 
New Orleans. 
Nogues, J. 1986. The timing and sequencing of liberalization: Peru. World Bank 
Typescript. 
Nogues, J., A. Olechowski, and L. A. Winters.  1986a. The extent of non tariff 
barriers to imports of developing countries. World Bank Staff Working Paper 
789. 
. 1986b. The extent of non tariff barriers to industrial countries’ imports. 
World Bank Economic Review (September):  181 -99. 
Pfefferman, G. 1985. Overvalued  exchange rates and development. Finance 
and Development 22 (March): 17-19. 
. Various issues. International jinancial statistics. 64  Sebastian EdwarddThomas 0.  EnderslJesus Silva-Herzog 
Pinera, J. 1986. La ley minera. Estudios Publicos 21 (Summer). 
Prebisch, R. 1984. Five stages in my thinking on development. In G. M. Meier 
and D.  Seers, eds., Pioneers in  development. Oxford: Oxford  University 
Press. 
Rodriguez-Mendoza, M.  1986. Latin America and the U.S. Trade and Tariff 
Act. Journal of  World Trade Law (February): 47-60. 
Thomas, V.  1986. Linking  macroeconomic and  agricultural  policies for ad- 
justment with growth. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
World Bank. 1986.  World development report. Washington, D.C. 
World currency yearbook. Various issues. 
2. Thomas 0.  Enders 
The Latin Debt Problem Can Be Downsized, 
but Growth Will Be Long in Coming Back 
Why is it that after nearly five years of sacrifice-per  capita income in 
Latin America has fallen by perhaps 8 percent in  the  1980s and will 
fall again this year-the  debt crisis appears no nearer to solution now 
than when it started? 
The current  crisis  in  Brazil-the  product  of  a weak  and  divided 
government reacting to its own loss of  control over the economy- 
throws a sharper light on that question; it puts the focus on the enduring 
domestic weaknesses that so exacerbate the impact of the debt. 
Theoretically, when Latin America reached its borrowing limits in 
1982, it could have gone on growing by sacrificing a couple of years’ 
increases  in  consumption,  increasing  savings,  switching  those  re- 
sources into exports, and running a trade surplus, in order to be able 
to service the debt without net new capital imports. Indeed, that is 
exactly what Korea did. 
Latin America did swing from a trade deficit in  1981 to surpluses 
ranging from $27 billion to $37 billion in the last four years. But it has 
done so only to a small extent by diverting to export goods that could 
have been consumed at home. After decades of attempting to indus- 
trialize by building protected and often highly subsidized import sub- 
stitution industries, Latin America-Brazil  is the only significant partial 
exception-has  had little to sell on the world market other than com- 
modities and less experience in selling it. As a result, most of the burden 
of achieving a trade surplus has fallen on imports, which in the 1980s 
have fallen by no less than 45 percent in real terms. 65  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
This brutal cut has been achieved by restrictions at the frontier rather 
than by reductions in spending at home. But that in turn has left massive 
unsatisfied demand. The result: a sharp continentwide surge in inflation. 
And, as prices accelerated, governments that in better times already 
had only limited ability to raise revenue found themselves falling further 
and further behind. Ballooning domestic debts have become a central 
preoccupation of every government in the hemisphere, with domestic 
interest payments taking a bigger and bigger share of national income. 
As fiscal deficits widened and foreign balances swung to surplus, less 
and less of savings has been available for investment, which has fallen 
from nearly a quarter of GNP to about a sixth. Dramatic programs to 
control inflation-the  Austral and Cruzado Price Freeze plans-have 
been  tried, have  worked  for a while  beyond  their authors’ wildest 
dreams, and  then,  in  at least  one case, failed beyond  their wildest 
dreams. Ironically, the country most capable of  switching resources 
from consumption to exports-Brazil-is  also the country that has most 
spectacularly lost control of domestic demand and watches as its nor- 
mally strong exports are sucked inexorably back into the country. 
As a result of these internal mechanisms, it has cost Latin America 
enormously in income and employment to generate the trade surplus 
required to service a constant or slowly growing debt. Already, half a 
decade of growth has been lost. And the social consequences-growing 
disorder and violence in many of the hemisphere’s main centers-are 
evident. Latin America shows no particular inclination to revert to the 
old populist dictators, who after all caused a lot of the economic prob- 
lems from which the continent now suffers. But some Latin American 
societies do show signs of becoming ungovernable. 
If it costs so much in lost income and  jobs  just to maintain the existing 
debt, why not do something about the debt itself? 
One alternative-the  Baker Plan-was  to ease the burden of the debt 
by seeking additional commercial bank lending conditioned on market- 
oriented policy reforms. Some reforms are in fact occurring, but it is 
now clear that no matter what their scope, creditors are and will remain 
reluctant to see their Latin American exposure increase. Although new 
money  has  been obtained in  individual cases-Mexico  and  Chile- 
private lenders continue overall to take out of  Latin America more 
than official lenders put in. 
Another alternative-the  Bradley Plan and countless variations-is 
debt relief. In light of the current Brazilian impasse, new calls are being 
made for adoption of  this solution, even though other major debtors 
are going in the opposite direction and conducting new  deals with 
creditors-Mexico,  Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela. While there are 
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or write off Latin American loans, they are unlikely to abandon claims 
for principal or interest without strong inducements or pressure. 
Given high, if  much reduced, exposure-Latin  debt was still about 
90  percent of the combined equity of U.S. money center and major 
regional banks at the end of  1985 and much higher for the former- 
there is no disposition on the part of the United States or other gov- 
ernments to pressure their banks to grant relief. And the borrower’s 
interest in at least rolling over the existing debt gives the creditor banks 
bargaining power. 
A third alternative-payments  moratoriums-has  a following in every 
country and of course keeps coming back as an option or bargaining 
tactic. Brazil has suspended payments pending a new restructuring. 
Peru  has limited  payments to  10  percent of  foreign earnings.  Both 
creditors and debtors are well aware that repudiation  might be a political 
opportunity for some thrusting leader to make a breakthough, as it was 
for Peron  a couple  of generations ago. But after decades of import 
substitution, more autarky is unlikely to work very well. And the im- 
mediate costs can be high as  countries try to  get on without trade credit 
or insurance. It will be interesting to see how Peru develops. Its partial 
moratorium was accompanied by a consumption boom. 
But now the party’s over and the question is whether Peru can grow 
without regularizing its participation in the world economy. That ques- 
tion applies even more strongly to Brazil. It is of course possible-and 
would  be  very damaging for all concerned-for  Brazil’s stalemated 
government to fail to find a timely  compromise with  the creditors. 
Argentina-struggling  with the erosion of the Austral Plan-could go 
into crisis at the same time.  But even if  both those events occur, it 
would be a country-specific failure, not the start of a systemic failure 
and one not likely to last forever.  Such moratoriums  are unlikely  to 
become the dominant phenomenon, unless there is a new, deep world- 
wide recession. At that point everything could start snapping. 
A final option  is the return of Latin money that has fled  abroad. 
There may be $100 billion or more of it. The usual fix on this is that if 
Latin countries adopt reliable  market-oriented policies,  some of the 
flight capital will go back. But recent experiments with tight money in 
Mexico and elsewhere suggest that some reflows  can be induced  if 
businesses find they have no alternative source of working capital. And 
governments are beginning  to incentivize  reflows  by  offering  some 
variant of the debt-for-equity swaps many countries now offer to  foreign 
nationals. 
By themselves none of these options offers a systemic solution. That 
said, there are plainly trends under way that will eventually-in  this 
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One is the use of incentives to lessen the amount of debt outstanding. 
Many countries permit foreign nationals to buy debt in the open market 
(at a discount) and exchange it  at par for equity. This is a form of 
subsidizing foreign investment. Clearly there are limits to it, given the 
small capital base for Latin American companies and concerns about 
foreign control and inflation. But there is a steady flow of transactions. 
Most of the open market purchases and sales of Latin American bank 
debt (perhaps $3 billion or $4 billion in a year) are related to debt-for- 
equity swaps. 
The same concept can be applied to company debt-a  much larger 
universe. Indeed, the new Mexican rescheduling agreement signed on 
March 20 does just that. 
These mechanisms can also be used  to attract flight capital back. 
Governments have an understandable concern about round-tripping, 
but the process is already starting. Mexico has just informed its cred- 
itors that such transactions will be authorized. The potential scope here 
is also very large. 
A second trend is toward more write-offs. European banks are the 
most advanced in this regard and many have either fully provisioned 
or sold off their Latin portfolios. U.S. banks will have more scope for 
such actions in the next few years. As a simple matter of arithmetic, 
should present earning trends continue, exposure of U.S. money center 
and major regional banks could fall to half its present level as a per- 
centage of capital by the end of the decade. Japanese banks are getting 
together to sell their Latin loans (at market discounts) to a sort of debt 
collection company. 
The problem here is to develop a mechanism by which write-downs 
and write-offs can be translated into an actual reduction in debt out- 
standing-the  interest of debtor-and  into reflief from participating in 
the next forced  rollover-the  interest  of  the creditor.  Work  is now 
underway  on  exchanges of existing debt for lower face value  debt 
bearing the same interest, but which would not be subject to refinancing 
at maturity. Debtors could write down the debt, but give up the quasi- 
automatic roll-over option. Creditors would take a hit on their balance 
sheet, but could get out of the next forced loan. The point would be 
to give more options to both creditors and debtors to find a mutually 
convenient way to recognize, loan by loan, country by country, that a 
lot of money has been invested at a loss and cannot be fully recovered. 
The third trend is toward more participation in the world economy. 
Mexico, once the most autarkic of all, is discovering the export market; 
at last it is keeping the exchange rate realistic and has made the historic 
decision  to join  GATT.  If  you  go to Monterrey  now,  you find  that 
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seeing their sales here take off. Last year, Mexico made more money 
exporting non-oil goods  than  petroleum. The collapsing price of oil 
contributed powerfully to the swing. But so did non-oil exports with 
growth of 34 percent.  One finds similar trends in Chile and many of 
the smaller countries. Simultaneously, attitudes toward foreign invest- 
ment are changing, and there is a continentwide move to privatize or 
at least subject state enterprise to better economic discipline. 
Finally, the cost of  the debt itself is coming down. Recent deals- 
Mexico, Chile, Venezuela-have  saved almost a full percentage point 
on earlier spreads. No doubt Brazil, when it finally comes to terms, 
will also succeed in comprising its spread. 
We swing from pessimism to optimism back to pessimism. Last year 
we  were  extolling Brazil and  excoriating  Mexico, with  well-known 
figures predicting Mexican collapse into anarchy or revolution. Today 
it is Brazil we agonize about. Actually, behind the stop/go so charac- 
teristic of  the hemisphere, the basic  situation is changing only with 
soul-trying slowness. 
Few Latin American  countries have sufficient capacity to govern 
expenditures and to raise revenue to control internal  demand. That 
defeated the Cruzado Plan, is defeating the Austral Plan, and could 
easily bring the currently improved performance of Mexico to grief. 
There is no evidence of any real institutional or political change in this 
crucial respect. 
Without adequate demand control and still with few internationally 
tradable goods, it is painfully difficult and astonishingly costly to divert 
domestic resources  to the creation of foreign trade  surpluses. That 
leaves Latin America clawing away at the problem: borrowing a few 
dollars more where it can, trying to compress the cost of  each new 
forced loan, using incentives to extinguish what debt it can, and just 
beginning to invent a capability to export goods other than commod- 
ities. The cumulative effect of each of these small changes will accel- 
erate. But it will be the end of the decade before most of the countries 
can come back to the market-perhaps  the most operational of defi- 
nitions of the conclusion of the crisis. 
Per capita income at the start of the 1990s will still be below that of 
1980. And nothing we know about Latin America permits us to believe 
that it can find its way back to the sustained 6 percent growth of the 
last generation that made it one of the important engines of U.S.  exports 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 69  The United States and Foreign Competition in Latin America 
3.  Jesus Silva-Herzog 
A Latin American Perspective 
Latin America is probably  going through the most severe economic 
and social crisis in more than fifty years. This is a well-known fact. 
After enjoying a period a relatively fast growth, Latin America began 
to see a profound  change in  its economic environment in  the early 
1980s. 
Today’s per capita income is 10 percent lower than in 1980. A number 
of social indicators are showing a serious deterioration that will affect 
potential growth. Investment has diminished; unemployment is on the 
rise, exports are sluggish, and the region has been a net exporter of 
capital since 1983. 
On the other hand, around 94 percent of the population of the region 
are now living under democratic regimes. 
The problem is not only the present  situation, but the immediate 
prospects, which do not look very promising. It is possible that the 
1980s will  be  remembered as a lost decade for the Latin American 
region as a whole. The basic reasons are complex and vary from country 
to country, even though there are some common elements. However, 
the explanation cannot rely on negative external factors or erroneous 
domestic policies alone. The basic causes of the process include both 
external and domestic factors. 
The essential responsibility, however, lies on the domestic front. We, 
the Latin Americans, are the ones mainly responsible for what hap- 
pened  in  Latin America. But we must recognize  that there were a 
number of important unfavorable external factors that contributed sig- 
nificantly to the origin and permanence of the crisis. 
The sudden and abrupt upward change in the level of interest rates 
in  1981, from low or negative real levels in the previous years, the 
deterioration of  the terms of  trade, and the interruption of  financial 
flows to the region after the summer of  1982 were very destabilizing 
elements in the Latin American picture. On the other hand, inward- 
oriented trade policies, heavy foreign borrowing, overvaluation of the 
currencies,  huge government deficits,  and a more generalized  infla- 
tionary atmosphere were domestic factors that have also contributed 
to the crisis. 
Given that it will be difficult to change the negative transfer of  re- 
sources in the short run, because of  the very high level of  external 
indebtedness, and that the prices of the main export commodities look 
unfavorable over the next few years, we might conclude that there are 
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the well-being of the majority of the population and to the democratic 
process that has been so welcome in different countries. Austerity and 
democracy cannot live together for too long. 
Latin America has faced the crisis in a serious and responsible man- 
ner. Basic economic attitudes that had been sustained for a long period 
of time are changing, and a closer perception of the necessary changes 
is more evident all over the region. Recent efforts to bring down in- 
flation through the so-called heterodox approach are good examples. 
In the basic challenge that lies ahead there is one essential element: 
resumption of economic growth. Growth needs to be stimulated as the 
only way to come out of the crisis. And growth will not come by itself. 
It will need the proper doses of  domestic economic policies, with a 
favorable external environment. 
The essential responsibility for growth lies with the Latin Americans. 
No one will do for us what we do not do for ourselves. One thing must 
be stressed: the emphasis on growth cannot be interpreted as forgetting 
about control of inflation. Avoiding rapid rates of inflation is a precon- 
dition for sustained economic growth. 
Given the economic constraints that we are facing and that we will 
face in the coming years, the resumption of  growth, with greater im- 
portance  attached  to  equity  considerations,  will  require  profound 
changes in  the economic policy of Latin America. Many of the tradi- 
tional ways things have been done in the region will have to be altered- 
from the essential orientation of trade policies to the basic  attitude 
toward the mobilization of internal savings and the role of the state. 
In the next few years it is reasonable to expect that the region will 
not have net external financing comparable to the levels of the past 
decade. This necessarily implies that greater reliance on domestic sav- 
ings will be absolutely necessary. We  will have to learn, as we have on 
several past occasions, to live more closely linked with our own means 
and to do more with less. 
On the other hand, an expansion of the export capacity will be the 
only way to earn the necessary foreign exchange to pay for imports 
and the service on the debt. If exports have always been a priority, at 
least in the official statements, today they have reached an indispens- 
able precondition level for the coming years. 
In the near future the options open to the Latin American countries 
will depend, perhaps to a greater degree than in the past, on a number 
of domestic determinants. This is not to say that we do not require an 
ample effort of international  economic cooperation but only that we 
will  depend more on our decisions and actions. 
The resumption of economic growth in Latin America will  require, 
in my opinion, four basic elements: (1) in the trade field, a more clearly 
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higher level  of  domestic savings and its improved  allocation; (3) in 
relation to the external debt problem, a more clear and definite solution; 
and (4)  a sustained effort to control inflation. 
After some brief comments on each element, the possible role of the 
United States in this region will be self-evident. 
Trade 
The Latin American region has been, in general, inward oriented 
during the last decades. The import substitution model followed after 
the Second World War, which was useful for a certain period of time, 
has produced  some important  domestic distortions that need  to be 
corrected, 
Protectionism was translated in many cases into a barrier to improved 
efficiency and productivity, resulting in a significant loss of international 
competitiveness. As the Economic Commission for Latin America has 
recently recognized, protectionism  was “excessive, too general, and 
too prolonged.” 
The only way Latin America will obtain the foreign exchange needed 
to pay for imports and to service its external debt is through an ex- 
pansion of exports, both of raw materials and of manufactured prod- 
ucts. This implies a needed change in the mentality of  government, 
business, and labor. It will not be easy, nor will it be obtained in the 
short run.  But it  is absolutely necessary.  We  already see some en- 
couraging signs, especially in Brazil and Mexico. Two things are es- 
sential to this objective. One, a lowering of the highly protectionist 
trade policies the majority of the Latin American countries have fol- 
lowed. And two, the maintenance of adequate exchange rate policies, 
avoiding a common phenomenon of overvaluation, which so deters the 
expansion of exports. 
There is enormous room for an expanded export of  manufactured 
products from Latin America. Latin American exports of manufactured 
products are less than one percent of total consumption in the industrial 
countries. A very small increase in market share in the United States 
or in other industrial countries, at the expense of East Asian or western 
European reductions, could mean a tremendous difference for the re- 
gion as a whole. 
However, we must recognize that we face a protectionist mood in 
the industrial countries and in the United  States. As  Sebastian Ed- 
wards’ paper mentions, to the extent that these nontariff barriers in- 
crease, or are maintained  at the current level, it will  become very 
difficult, if not plainly impossible, for the Latin American countries to 
increase their exports at the rate required to solve their current debt 
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While the main responsibility for increasing exports rests within the 
Latin American countries, their efforts, no matter how serious, can be 
easily frustrated by the protectionist policies of the industrialized world. 
The reciprocal trade between the Latin American countries has di- 
minished during the years of the crisis. We  now have a special oppor- 
tunity  to foster in  a more  aggressive way the efforts for economic 
integration. It could be a way that better utilizes existing capacity and 
scarce foreign exchange resources. 
Savings 
The reduction in foreign borrowing necessarily implies the need to 
rely more on domestic  resources.  Thus we  need to foster domestic 
savings, including savings in the public sector, where they have been 
negative. A positive real interest rate, a tax policy directed at stimu- 
lating savings, a decisive effort to reduce public sector deficits, the 
possible  establishment of  mechanisms  to attract  the  repatriation of 
capital invested abroad, and new flows of foreign investments are es- 
sential elements for the fulfillment of this objective. 
In this connection, a healthy trend has been the selling back to the 
private sector of a number of government companies in different coun- 
tries. The process has begun; now it needs further acceleration. 
Debt 
The difficult and very tiresome yearly restructuring exercises and 
the obtaining of fresh money on a forced lending basis has given the 
Latin American debtors time and breathing space, but the debt problem 
is not solved. More debt to solve the debt problem is not the solution. 
The issue is becoming more and more politicized. In industrial countries 
the problem is still of a financial nature. In the debtor countries it is a 
highly political issue. Latin America and its creditors are beginning to 
feel so-called debt fatigue. 
The problem needs to be recognized  as one that impedes the re- 
sumption of growth. A new, more farsighted attitude needs to be adopted, 
and  the  closer interrelationship between  trade  and  debt  should  be 
recognized. 
Different approaches, so far considered unorthodox, will increas- 
ingly take the place of the more business-as-usual  arrangements. In 
this connection, the adjustment of payments to a debtor country’s real 
capacity to pay will also be increasingly observed. The concept of debt 
relief, a reduction of  the debt burden, is growing in  acceptance in 
different circles. 
Any economic projection exercise for the region as a whole makes 
impossible the maintenance of the present debt burden and an adequate 
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basic situation of the three main Latin debtors-Argentina,  Brazil, and 
Mexico-may  become more similar in 1987 than in any of the previous 
years since the debt crisis began. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that Latin America has been neglected 
by the United States. The region has not been given proper attention. 
We  do not represent a great risk. Nor do we represent a great economic 
or security advantage. 
In the recent past, Washington’s interest in Latin America has been 
overshadowed by its obsession with Central America. However, what 
the United States will or will not do will affect Latin America in a very 
direct manner. One important U.S. contribution would be to give greater 
attention to the repercussions of  its own national economic decisions. 
Finally, the United States has a long tradition of pragmatism, while 
Latin America has been under the influence of  ideological considera- 
tions for many years. But now it seems the roles have changed: we are 
pragmatic, and the United States is now religious. 
The external presence has been too dominant in recent years, and 
we require more indigenous solutions of our own. They are essential 
for successful implementation  and for the  society in  general.  Latin 
America has an enormous potential for economic and social growth. 
Important changes are taking place within democratic regimes that are 
in essence stimulating the possibility of change. They require a better 
climate in the international world, and I think it can be provided. 
Summary of Discussion 
The discussion centered around the opportunities and climate for direct 
investment in Latin America and the need for a global solution to the 
problems of  the region. 
Peter Peterson was struck by the apparent contradiction between the 
need for the Latin American debtors to increase manufacturing exports 
and the fact that a correction in the U.S. trade balance implies that the 
U.S. role as the market for manufacturing imports will have to change. 
The United States will have to become a manufactured goods exporter 
to pay the interest on the debt and eventually the principal; this suggests 
a roughly $200 billion  swing in  the U.S. manufactured goods trade 
balance. 
Thomas Enders pointed out that the current Latin American trade 
surplus with the United States is probably sufficient to sustain the debt 
service with growth, but agreed that in the face of a large swing in 
Latin America’s trade balance with the United States, the debts would 
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Sebastian Edwards agreed that there is no way for the debtor coun- 
tries to service their debt and run trade deficits with the United States. 
He noted that the aggregate U.S. share in Latin American manufac- 
turing imports has been about the same since 1970. The composition 
has shifted significantly, he noted, especially from manufactured goods 
to food. Most strikingly, total imports of the region fell by  about 50 
percent in real terms. For Latin American imports from the United 
States to increase, exports will have to increase. The adjustment to 
the debt problems has come more than entirely in imports, since de- 
clining terms of trade have caused the value of exports to decline since 
1982. 
Jesus Silva-Herzog agreed that everyone wants to export, but argued 
that the United States could increase manufacturing imports from Latin 
America and correct its own trade imbalances by focusing on the re- 
gions of the world where its trade deficit is more important and where 
the primary problem lies. Latin American problems are not independent 
of  other problems, agreed Saburo Okita. The solution to the need of 
both  the  United  States and Latin America to increase exports will 
indeed require increased imports in other parts of the world, such as 
Japan, Taiwan, and other emerging countries. 
Attention shifted to the possibilities for direct investment and their 
role in a resolution of the problems of the region. Philip Caldwell argued 
that, Silva-Herzog to the contrary, he has not seen any fundamental 
change in policy toward direct investment in Latin America. The key 
word is profit, and he has not seen any encouragement there. He ex- 
pressed doubt about the idea of investing during the downslide, as he 
has tried that four or five times without getting close to any upswing; 
more and more of his colleagues say they are giving up unless and until 
opportunities for profit improve. 
George Vojta concurred and wondered how far the political endorse- 
ment  of  equity  investment had  come.  He suggested that  the policy 
orientation has moved but that the essential doctrines are fundamen- 
tally intact. 
The Andean Pact discourages investment, reported Maurice Green- 
berg, who claimed that bilateral treaties are needed to encourage in- 
vestment. Enders suggested that this type of treaty will be negotiable 
and proposed  that, while the climate will  be  spotty for a while, the 
situation  will  become  more  reliable.  He pointed  out that many au- 
tomakers are investing in  Mexico, where  the number  of  controlled 
domestic prices  has been  reduced  substantially.  Automobile invest- 
ments-primarily  for  export-were  mandated  by  decree  for  those 
who  wished  to continue a  domestic  presence  in  Mexico.  Such  in- 
vestments have been  the  source of  more recent profit problems for 
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Rudiger Dornbusch disagreed with Caldwell’s characterization of the 
lack of political change in the region. He pointed out that the area is 
in a major depression, worse than the depression of  the  1930s. The 
upswings were there quite recently, he argued, noting that the main 
source of profits for Ford in  1981 was Argentinean income, as over- 
valuation made repatriation very profitable. The profit aberrations of 
the early  1980s  have been  largely dissipated by  later economic and 
political upheavals which have caused the more current unsatisfactory 
investment environment. 
There has been a move to a more liberal trade regime, argued Silva- 
Herzog.  In  Mexico in  1982, for example, all manufactured imports 
required permits, but by  1985  such quantitative restrictions were be- 
ginning to decrease, and now only a third of  imports are under such 
restrictions. Thus, while official prices have been established as com- 
pensation, the picture has completely changed. Furthermore, Mexico 
has joined GATT. A basic change is taking place in the orientation of 
production and marketing outward, after four decades of  looking in- 
ward. The situation is similar in other countries, but it may be too early 
after the basic decisions for Caldwell to see the change. 
On the foreign investment question, Silva-Herzog conceded that re- 
cently the situation has not been very favorable. There are indications, 
however, that some investment is coming in to take advantage of the 
approaching  upswing. There  are indications  that the regulations  on 
direct investment are being applied  in  a more  flexible manner than 
before. There are serious misunderstandings in industrialized countries 
about the degree to which Mexico, for example, still restricts foreign 
investment. In the highly publicized IBM case, the problem was that 
IBM’s terms could not be better than those given to Hewlett-Packard 
and Apple. After all, IBM has been in Mexico for forty years. The 
rules on foreign investment are clear and decreasingly discretionary. 
Ten years ago there was the same legislation and large foreign inflows, 
so the problem is not the legislation. 
Several people commented on capital flight and its possible repatri- 
ation. The foreign money will come in when capital flight money is 
repatriated, suggested Robert Ingersoll. 
Silva-Herzog explained that the most important cause of capital flight 
was speculation against overvalued currencies in 1981. People expected 
a devaluation and they were right. Eventually general economic pros- 
pects determine capital flight. In Mexico in 1984 and 1985, for example, 
a search for safety provoked capital flight. There can be other reasons 
for capital flight, or reflow. In the second half of 1986 a credit squeeze 
forced domestic businesses to resort  to repatriation as a  source of 
working capital. Contributing factors were a high real interest rate and 
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Special incentives for repatriation are politically difficult to sustain, 
Silva-Herzog pointed out. For this reason, subsidized debt-equity swaps 
do not have a bright future, he believes.  In response to a suggestion 
by  Bruce Atwater that the amount of the capital flight was roughly 
proportional to the external debt, Silva-Herzog argued that some of 
the higher estimates of the amount of capital flight are highly exagger- 
ated. He brought the discussion around to broader issues by arguing 
that confidence is the key to capital reflow and that no simple policy 
of high real interest rates and exchange rate undervaluation will bring 
the capital back; the answer is a longer-term solution to the debt prob- 
lem itself. 
Thomas Johnson and Rudiger Dornbusch agreed with this analysis 
from two different points of view. Johnson contended that a policy of 
focusing on getting foreign or repatriated capital will be self-defeating 
if  it only treats the symptoms. Dornbusch alluded to recent develop- 
ments in  the economic literature on the option  value of time which 
suggest that in a highly uncertain environment it will always pay for 
capital that has flown to wait until the incentives for repatriation  are 
entirely frontloaded so as to compensate for the risk of getting stuck. 
This type of program is self-defeating, as the level of profits required 
is impossible to sustain politically, especially since the economies have 
shrunk so much that there is not that much incentive available. 
Focus then shifted to the broad outlines of a resolution to the debt 
crisis. John Block argued that there is a double standard in the treatment 
of the large money-center banks and banks in rural America, where 
no one is bailing out anybody. The cloud of the interest burden hangs 
over the debtor economies, discouraging investment because the future 
is  so uncertain. It is time, he believes,  that people  accept that the 
money just is not coming back with interest. 
Gerald Corrigan made  several summary points.  First, there is no 
magic plan that will solve all the problems. Second, sovereign debt is 
more  difficult  to deal with  than private debt, partly because every 
decision requires a consensus of hundreds of partners, private, gov- 
ernmental, and multinational, not to mention the lawyers. Third, the 
Latin American countries have, all things considered, done a good job 
of policy adjustment. The nature and direction of change is correct. 
Corrigan recommended  taking the long view in the search for a so- 
lution. Growth is key. We  are in the fifth year of worldwide growth, 
and it may be difficult to sustain this growth for five more years, but 
we have to do it. This requires, among other things, keeping inflation 
under control. A second key is a flow of savings into these developing 
countries, as development  always requires external financing. What- 
ever form the solution takes, it will involve positive net capital flows. 
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one is worse off. Finally new techniques and instruments, such as the 
debt-equity swap, can be useful, but not as a generalized approach. 
Enders agreed about the need for growth. He added a note of caution, 
however, adding that it used  to be  said that if  the price of  oil and 
interest rates would fall and U.S.  growth sustain itself, the debt problem 
would go away. These conditions prevailed, yet the problem  is  still 
with us.  Policy reform received his emphasis as well. He suggested 
that even more  emphasis is needed  on the fundamentals within the 
debtor countries. These countries still cannot tax income, and without 
taxes these shocks are difficult to solve. In this area there is less room 
for optimism than elsewhere. More generally, the issue of continuity 
in policy reform remains; investors wonder how long policy changes 
will last. In summary, Enders believes that a variety of individual in- 
struments and partial solutions will be needed. The creditors and debt- 
ors must realize that much money has been invested nonprofitably. 
Silva-Herzog echoed the need for consistency in policy and proposed 
that the approach be long term. Closer links between debt and trade 
are needed but not clearly accepted. 